# Gaps & Improvements

Findings only — nothing in this document has been fixed as part of writing it. Sourced from re-verifying prior audits against current source, plus a fresh automated review pass across the storefront (website) and backoffice (admin). Organized by the lens each finding matters most to; several findings matter to more than one role and are cross-referenced rather than duplicated.

---

## As a Customer / End User

1. **Ed25519 admin-auth "session expired" and "invalid signature" recovery screens are dead UI.** Both are fully built and wired, but `toAuthErrorShape()` (`core/auth/services/auth.service.ts:110-118`) derives the error code from HTTP status only, never a body-level code — so a real backend 401 always shows the generic "Unauthorized" screen instead. Also an [Engineering](#as-backend--api-engineer) and [Backend](#as-backend--api-engineer) item.
2. **Dark mode selector does nothing.** The light/dark/system dropdown saves correctly, but no CSS anywhere reads the `data-theme-mode` attribute it sets — picking anything but Light changes nothing visually.
3. **"Site Layout" selector (Theme section) has no effect.** `layout.type` is edited but page rendering only ever reads each page's own `layout`, never the top-level selector.
4. **Footer "Contacts" link has nothing behind it.** No static-page content exists for it at all in the bootstrap data (unlike other footer legal pages, which are populated).
5. **Product pages get no per-product SEO.** `SeoService.setItemMeta(item)` — the method that would set per-product Open Graph/canonical tags — exists but is **never called anywhere in the codebase**. Every product page ships only the site-wide default meta tags.
6. **`og:locale` is hardcoded to `'ru_RU'`** in both SEO meta-tag code paths, regardless of the active locale — a real gap for EN/HY visitors' social-share previews.
7. **No structured data (JSON-LD) and no sitemap generation exist anywhere** — confirmed absent, not partially built. Sitemap is backend-only work; JSON-LD would need net-new frontend code.
8. **Checkout's payment-description fallback is a hardcoded Russian string** (`'Покупка на Маркетплейсе'`) used as a last resort when no brand name or hostname is available — single-tenant-framed wording in a multi-tenant product.
9. **Brand color contrast fails WCAG AA.** `--border-color` measures 1.24–1.42:1 against a 3:1 UI-component requirement in every theme; `--success`/`--warning`/`--error`/`--info-color` fail 4.5:1 when used as plain text. Real palette colors, not a token bug — see [Accessibility](#as-accessibility-reviewer).
10. **`stars.component.scss:10` uses a literal hex color** (`#cdd6d5`) with no design token behind it — any future palette change will silently miss this one glyph.
11. **No multi-vendor cart handling exists.** Checkout is one inline flow producing exactly one order from one payment popup; a cart with items from multiple sellers has no defined behavior (relevant the moment Seller Management ships beyond its current disabled-by-default placeholder).

---

## As Product Owner / Business

1. **Backend completion is ~10%.** Only Categories has a real HTTP implementation on the admin side; every other domain (Orders, Products, Users, Transactions, Monitoring, Moderation, Analytics, Customers) runs entirely on mock data today. The frontend is feature-complete against that mock data; production readiness is blocked entirely on backend work, not frontend polish.
2. **The admin role model is decorative.** `AdminRole`/permissions exist in code, but **nothing gates any button, page, or action on them anywhere in the app.** Anyone who passes admin authentication has full access regardless of their assigned role. This is a real authorization gap, not a display nicety, and should be scoped before any real admin backend goes live with multiple operators.
3. **Payment options are limited to QR and card via one custom flow** — no additional providers (wallets, buy-now-pay-later) are wired or planned; needs a business decision on which providers, if any, before integration work starts.
4. **Advanced analytics (traffic, funnels, heatmaps) has no data source at all** — not a missing endpoint, a missing tracking pipeline. Flagged as the single largest ("XL") remaining backend effort, deliberately last in the build order because it depends on every other commerce domain being real first.
5. **Seller Management has eight cross-linked documents for a capability that is disabled by default and has zero backend bytes.** Real risk if it proceeds: at least three of those documents independently restate the same undecided "Unified vs. Split Orders" question — a decision change means updating multiple documents in sync, not one. Worth a consolidation pass before backend implementation starts.
6. **Two competing "seller" type shapes exist with no conversion between them** (`SellerConfig` in bootstrap models vs. `Seller`/`SellerBranding` in the domain layer) — self-flagged during Seller Management design work, restated here as unresolved. Recommend resolving (pick one, or document a mapping) before real backend work on that capability begins.
7. **No reusable feature-flag/capability-guard service exists**, despite one being promised by an existing ADR. The one current consumer of `sellerManagement.enabled` hand-rolls the check inline; every future flag will either duplicate that pattern or need the promised service built retroactively under time pressure.
8. **The Seller Management "enabled" code path has never been manually exercised**, even once — every verification claim about it was tested with the flag at its real-world value, `false`. Low risk today (nothing renders differently yet), but worth a fixture-based test the first time any enabled-state UI is actually built.
9. **Two large lazy-loaded bundle chunks remain unaddressed**: `project-editor` (~1.0 MB) and `catalog-container` (~330–375 kB). No mechanical split has been found; needs a dedicated profiling pass, ideally under real backend latency rather than instant mock responses.

---

## As QA / Test Engineering

1. **Automated test coverage is thin relative to the stated 80% target.** 11 spec files exist repo-wide (up from 5 before this cycle's test-foundation sprint); measured baseline is ~32% statements, ~19% branches, ~22% functions, ~33% lines. This is an honest foundation, not a coverage floor — no CI gate is set on it yet, deliberately, until a real floor number can be justified.
2. **Zero E2E tests exist anywhere in the repo.** No Playwright/Cypress/equivalent config found. Critical flows (storefront checkout, admin CRUD, builder draft→publish→live) have no automated regression coverage beyond the unit/facade specs added this cycle.
3. **Several "verified live" claims in prior audits were actually code-inspection only**, not real authenticated click-throughs — consistently because `/edit`, `/edit/:section`, and `/backoffice` require Telegram admin login, which cannot be completed in the automated environment those passes ran in. Worth flagging to a human tester before trusting those UI claims as fully proven: the manifest-aware layout picker (Sprint E), and multiple backoffice-auth-gated wording checks (Monitoring, Reports) among them.
4. **No real screen-reader software pass (NVDA/VoiceOver) has ever been performed anywhere in the app** — every accessibility claim in every audit to date is based on automated accessibility-tree inspection only (`role`, `aria-*` attribute presence), never an actual screen-reader session. This is a repo-wide gap, not specific to one page.
5. **A reactive-signal staleness bug was found and fixed in Seller Management's enabled-flag read** (it read the bootstrap snapshot once at construction instead of reactively) — worth a general regression-test pattern for any future flag/config read that should track `bootstrapRevision()`, since this bug class is easy to reintroduce and was invisible until specifically looked for.
6. **No facade-level tests exist yet for cart/checkout, moderation, or most admin domains** (Orders, Products, Users, Transactions, Monitoring were explicitly scoped out of this cycle's test-foundation sprint to stay within its time budget) — these are exactly the domains about to get real backends, so they carry the most regression risk with the least current coverage.

---

## As Backend / API Engineer

See [BACKEND-API-REFERENCE.md](BACKEND-API-REFERENCE.md) for the full contract. Structural gaps worth flagging here specifically:

1. **Only 2 of 11 admin gateway domains (Categories, Dashboard-metrics) have a DI-token seam.** The other 9 — Orders, Products, Users, Transactions, Monitoring, Moderation, plus derived Customers/Analytics — inject their mock gateway class directly. A token has to be added to each before any real backend can be bound, independent of how easy that domain's actual endpoint is to build.
2. **`AdminRole` is defined twice with unrelated shapes** (auth string-union vs. a Users-page display interface) — needs a naming reconciliation before the real role table is built.
3. **Two unrelated `Category` types exist**, both fed by the same `/category` response, both still in active use.
4. **Duplicate search models** exist under two different module paths.
5. **The error envelope is entirely a proposal** — no interceptor in the app inspects error response bodies today; every error reaction happens at the raw HTTP-status level. Adopting an envelope is a net-new build for both sides, not a preservation of existing behavior.
6. **429 (rate limiting) has zero client-side handling anywhere** — no interceptor, facade, or component references it. If the backend rate-limits, today's frontend has no graceful path for that response.
7. **No API versioning scheme has been decided** — no version segment, no version header, anywhere in the client.
8. **Centralized error-handling scaffolding exists but was never built.** `src/app/core/error-handling/`, `src/app/core/guards/`, and `src/app/core/interceptors/` each contain only a `.gitkeep` file — someone planned a shared error-handling layer, and every caller still handles failures ad hoc at the call site instead. Worth building once real backends start returning the error envelope in [BACKEND-API-REFERENCE.md](BACKEND-API-REFERENCE.md), rather than adding another one-off handler per facade.
9. **Admin Reports and Seller Management pages have zero data wiring of any kind** — not even a mock gateway call. Reports reuses `AdminAnalyticsFacade` (itself mock-derived) for its numbers; Seller Management is a static placeholder page with no `HttpClient` reference anywhere. Neither is currently a "swap the gateway" job — Reports inherits whatever Analytics becomes, Seller Management has no data layer to swap yet.
10. **Two per-domain provider tokens have a dead mock branch, silently.** `PRODUCT_DATA_PROVIDER` and `CATEGORY_REPOSITORY` always resolve to the real API implementation regardless of `useMockData` — there is no mock class bound to either token. Anyone toggling mock mode expecting storefront products/categories to mock out will be surprised; only Bootstrap, Backoffice-widget-data, and Admin-Categories actually respect the mock/api switch.

---

## As Accessibility Reviewer

1. **Brand color contrast genuinely fails WCAG AA** — see [Product Owner item 9 above](#as-product-owner--business) for the numbers. This requires a theme-owner sign-off before any fix ships, since it changes brand appearance, not just token values.
2. **No screen-reader software testing has ever been performed on this codebase** — every existing accessibility verification (including in this review) is automated accessibility-tree inspection, never a real NVDA/VoiceOver session. Recommend at least one manual pass on the highest-traffic flows (checkout, product page, admin login) before treating any part of the app as accessibility-verified end to end.
3. **Known past pattern worth re-checking elsewhere:** a raw `<textarea>` (no dedicated shared textarea component exists in the codebase) previously shipped without its `aria-label`/label association wired correctly in one place (Seller Management's Message field, since fixed). Any other raw `<textarea>` usage in the app should be checked for the same gap, since the shared `app-input` component handles this automatically but plain textareas do not.

---

## As Engineering / Tech Debt

1. **`navigation.header`** (header top-nav list) is editable in the builder but has zero runtime consumer — the header's actual menu comes from a different source entirely. Needs a product decision on positioning/behavior before it's real feature work, not a wiring fix.
2. **`catalog.navigationMode`** renders an intentional placeholder — confirmed not a bug, but the alternate nav UIs it implies (mega-menu, top-carousel, left-nav) don't exist yet if ever wanted.
3. **Angular 22 upgrade is researched but not started** (~2–3.5 days estimated, needs a dependency fix and Node version bump first). Explicitly recommended as its own dedicated session, never bundled with feature work.
4. **`MarketplaceRef` and `TenantConfig` both represent "a marketplace" from two different vantage points** — a deliberate, documented distinction today, but worth consolidating if a third marketplace-shaped type is ever proposed.
5. **`sellerId` fields are typed as bare `string` instead of the `UUID` alias** used everywhere else in the newer sellers domain — zero functional impact, pure convention drift, cheap to fix opportunistically.
6. **No shared breadcrumb component exists anywhere** — the only breadcrumb logic in the entire storefront is one local signal inside the catalog container, duplicated conceptually wherever a future breadcrumb might be needed.
7. **Bootstrap `apiEndpoints.{website,builder,backoffice}` are empty objects in the mock today** — meaning no builder or backoffice CRUD path exists as a literal anywhere in the client. Any concrete path documented for those domains is a proposal until this is populated.

---

## Cross-cutting / process

- **Documentation was spread across 60+ overlapping markdown files** at the time of this review (status trackers, sprint plans, multiple overlapping backend specs, several audit reports referencing each other) — consolidated as part of this same pass into this file, [BACKEND-API-REFERENCE.md](BACKEND-API-REFERENCE.md), and whatever the team chooses to keep going forward. Recommend a lighter-weight doc set than before: one living gaps list (this file), one backend contract, source-of-truth code — not a new pile of point-in-time sprint reports.
- **A running list of "Requires backend decision" items with recommended defaults already exists** inside `BACKEND-API-REFERENCE.md` and the source material behind it — treat those as the first thing to walk through with the client/backend team, since most already have a suggested default and don't need a meeting, only a sign-off.

---

## Automated code review — website (storefront)

*Findings from a fresh source-level pass over `src/app/pages`, `src/app/features/website`, `src/app/features/search`, `src/app/widgets`, and the project-editor/builder. Each item includes a file:line reference and the role it matters most to.*

### Cart / Checkout

- `[Product Owner]` No dedicated checkout feature exists — `src/app/features/website/checkout/` and `src/app/features/website/cart/` are empty `.gitkeep` placeholders; the entire cart/payment flow lives in the legacy `src/app/pages/cart/`.
- `[Engineering]` The post-payment email/phone capture flow (`submitEmail`, `onEmailInput`, `onPhoneInput`, `validateEmail`, `validatePhone`) is dead code — the template has no matching `<input>` anywhere, so these methods are never invoked (`src/app/pages/cart/cart.component.ts:507-729`).
- `[Product Owner]` Because that form is unreachable, `recordOrder()` always submits the backoffice order with an empty `email`/`phone` for every purchase (`src/app/pages/cart/cart.component.ts:418-441`).
- `[Engineering]` `autoSubmitPurchase()` schedules navigation to home via `setTimeout(…, 0)` unconditionally at the top of the method, before checking for a Telegram user ID or waiting on the `submitPurchaseEmail` call — navigation fires regardless of submission success or failure (`cart.component.ts:443-454`).
- `[User]` When no Telegram user ID is available, `autoSubmitPurchase()` only logs to console and returns silently — no toast/notification, even as the popup is already closing (`cart.component.ts:450-454`).
- `[Engineering / Security]` Payment `currency` is hardcoded to `'RUB'` in both `createPayment()` and `recordOrder()`, ignoring `LanguageService.currentCurrency()` — the total shown to the user can diverge from the currency actually sent to the payment gateway (`cart.component.ts:257,436`).
- `[Security]` `amount` and per-item prices sent to `POST /cart` are computed entirely client-side from cart data in localStorage/Telegram CloudStorage, with no server round-trip to re-verify live prices before payment creation — a tampered local cart could request payment at an incorrect amount unless the backend independently revalidates (`cart.component.ts:253-266`, `services/cart.service.ts:133-190`).
- `[QA]` `copyPaymentLink()` failure path only does `console.error` — no visible feedback that "copy link" failed (`cart.component.ts:495-505`).
- `[Engineering]` Hardcoded Russian fallback string `'Покупка на Маркетплейсе'` used as the QR payment description when no brand name/hostname resolves — bypasses i18n entirely (`cart.component.ts:592-604`). See also [Customer item 8](#as-a-customer--end-user).
- `[QA]` Cart quantity increases (`increaseQuantity`, `CartService.updateQuantity`/`addItem`) never validate against the item's available stock — a user can raise a cart line past what's in stock with no cap or warning (`cart.component.ts:119-121`, `cart.service.ts:206-256`).
- `[Accessibility]` Swipe-to-reveal-delete on mobile cart rows is touch-only; a fallback always-visible delete button exists, but nothing makes the swipe *state itself* keyboard-reachable (`cart.component.ts:140-163`).
- `[Product Owner]` Terms-of-service links (public offer, return policy, guarantee, privacy policy) are plain placeholder text on the cart page, explicitly flagged in-code as needing real backend-configured links (`cart.component.html:147-152`).

### Auth

- `[Security]` The customer web session id is stored in a plain, non-`HttpOnly` cookie set via `document.cookie` — readable by any script, exfiltratable via XSS (`services/auth.service.ts:173-180`).

### Search

- `[i18n]` `SearchFacade.popularSearches` is a hardcoded English list ("Smartphones", "Sneakers", …) never routed through translation — renders in English regardless of active locale (`features/search/facade/search.facade.ts:58-91`).
- `[Product Owner]` `SearchTrendingService.loadTrending()` is a stub that always returns `null` ("Endpoint not available yet") — trending searches are non-functional end to end, and it overwrites the (already-hardcoded) fallback popular list with an empty one every time (`features/search/services/search-trending.service.ts:7-10`).

### Catalog

- `[Performance]` Catalog fetches at most 200 products per category in one call, then filters/sorts/paginates entirely client-side over that fixed batch — categories with more than 200 products silently truncate with no indication, and every filter/sort change re-processes the whole in-memory array instead of re-querying (`features/website/catalog/containers/catalog-container.component.ts:160,675-699`).
- `[Engineering / tech-debt]` `restoreContinueBrowsing()` is fully implemented (restores search/sort/layout/scroll) but never called anywhere — "continue browsing" state is saved on every interaction but never actually restored (`catalog-container.component.ts:901-929`).
- `[Engineering]` Non-numeric category route tokens are resolved by fetching the entire category tree and slugifying titles client-side — fragile against duplicate or renamed category titles, and loads the full tree just to resolve one slug (`catalog-container.component.ts:943-959`).
- `[Performance]` Price-range filter inputs trigger a full catalog recompute + URL sync on every keystroke, with no debounce (unlike the search box) (`features/website/catalog/components/filters-panel/filters-panel.component.ts:80-94`).
- `[QA]` Range filter min/max inputs have no validation preventing `min > max` — an inverted range silently yields zero results with no explicit error state (`filters-panel.component.ts:80-94`, `.html:56-76`).

### Product details

- `[User]` The "Notify Me" button (shown when out of stock) is wired to `toggleWishlist()` — it does not create any real back-in-stock subscription, just relabels the wishlist button (`features/website/product/containers/product-details-container.component.ts:356-358`, `product-actions.component.html:22-24`).
- `[Engineering]` "Buy Now" calls `addToCart()` (which resolves item data via an async, subscribed call inside `CartService.addItem`) and immediately navigates to `/cart` without awaiting completion — the cart page can render before the item has actually been added (`product-details-container.component.ts:306-320`, `cart.service.ts:206-243`).

### Product cards / search results

- `[Engineering / tech-debt]` The "Quick View" button on every search-results product card emits `quickViewPlaceholder`, but no parent component anywhere binds that output — clicking it is a dead end (`components/product-card/product-card.component.html:23-25`, `.ts:83-87`, `catalog/components/search-results/search-results.component.html:18-33`).

### Wishlist / Compare

- `[i18n]` The Compare table renders `product.name`/description fields/color/size straight off the raw product object instead of through `getTranslatedField()` — names and specs on the Compare page always show the source language regardless of active locale (`features/website/user-experience/compare/components/compare-table.component.ts:42-58`).
- `[Product Owner]` Wishlist, compare, recently-viewed, and saved searches are all localStorage-only via `USER_EXPERIENCE_REPOSITORY`, with no server sync to the authenticated Telegram session — data is lost on device change or storage clear despite the app having real login (`facades/platform/user-experience.facade.ts:1-137`).

### Widgets / Page builder

- `[Engineering]` `DataSourceResolverService.resolve()` has no `catchError`/fallback on any branch — an API failure while loading a widget's data propagates as an unhandled Observable error (`widgets/resolvers/data-source-resolver.service.ts:20-52`).
- `[User]` Because of the above, a single failing widget just silently fails to render (stays blank) — no retry, error message, or loading skeleton anywhere in the chain (`layouts/containers/dynamic-page-layout.component.ts:55-61`, `dynamic-renderer/widget-host/widget-host.service.ts:23-58`).
- `[Engineering / tech-debt]` `'html'`, `'banner'`, and `'partners'` widget types have full data-resolution logic written but no entry in `APPROVED_WIDGET_COMPONENTS` — configuring one of these renders `UnknownWidgetComponent` on the live storefront instead of real content (`widgets/registry/widget-registry.bootstrap.service.ts:9-17`, `data-source-resolver.service.ts:218-257`).
- `[Accessibility]` The hero widget carousel auto-advances every 5s whenever `data.autoplay` is set, with no pause/stop control exposed to the user — only the CSS entrance animation respects `prefers-reduced-motion`, the autoplay timer itself does not (WCAG 2.2.2 risk) (`widgets/ui/hero-widget.component.ts:292-301`).

### Static / CMS pages

- `[User]` `loadByKey`/`loadByPath` subscribe with only a `next` handler, no `error` callback — if bootstrap loading fails, `loading` stays `true` forever and the page shows an infinite spinner with no error state (`pages/static-page/static-page.component.ts:76-92`).

### i18n / Performance

- `[Performance]` `TranslatePipe` is declared `pure: false`, so every `| translate` binding (hundreds across templates — 40+ on the cart page alone) re-evaluates on every change-detection cycle instead of only when the language changes — a real cost at scale even under `OnPush` components (`i18n/translate.pipe.ts:4-14`).

## Automated code review — backoffice (admin)

*Findings from a fresh source-level pass over every `src/app/features/admin/*` module and `src/app/features/backoffice`. Each item includes a file:line reference and the role it matters most to.*

### Security / Authorization

- `[Security]` `adminAuthGuard` only checks `isAuthenticated()` — there is no role/permission check anywhere in the codebase (zero matches for a permission check project-wide). Any authenticated admin, including a seeded "viewer" role, can perform every destructive action: delete products/orders, change any user's role, refund orders (`core/admin-auth/admin-auth.guard.ts:6-15`). Same root cause as [Product Owner item 2](#as-product-owner--business).
- `[Security]` `AdminRole.permissions` arrays (owner/admin/editor/viewer) exist only as display labels — nothing gates a button, route, or action on them (`features/admin/users/services/admin-users-local.gateway.ts:7-12`, `admin-users-page.component.ts:59-64`).
- `[Security]` Nothing prevents suspending or demoting the last remaining `owner`-role user — `setStatus`/`setRole` apply unconditionally (`features/admin/users/facade/admin-users.facade.ts:35-41`).
- `[Security]` Category slug-uniqueness check **fails open**: on API error, `isSlugTaken` swallows the error and returns `false` ("not taken"), letting a duplicate/conflicting slug through silently instead of blocking submission (`features/admin/categories/services/admin-categories-api.gateway.ts:56-65`).

### Audit / Traceability

- `[Security]` Audit/timeline entries hardcode `actor: 'admin'` as a literal string instead of the real authenticated admin's identity — the "who did this" record is meaningless the moment more than one admin uses the system. Affects role/status changes, transaction retry/fraud-flag, and review moderation (`features/admin/users/services/admin-users-local.gateway.ts:93-94`; `transactions/services/admin-transactions-local.gateway.ts:41,50`; `moderation/services/admin-moderation-local.gateway.ts:64,74`).
- `[Security]` Orders have no actor/audit field at all — `AdminOrderTimelineEntry` has no `actor` property, so cancel/refund/status-change history records *what* changed but never *who* changed it, for the most financially sensitive module in the app (`features/admin/orders/models/admin-order.model.ts:32-36`).

### Destructive actions with missing/inconsistent confirmation

- `[Admin-operator]` Product delete (single row and bulk) removes the product permanently with **zero confirmation of any kind**, not even a native `confirm()` (`features/admin/products/components/admin-products-list.component.html:134,161` → `admin-products.facade.ts:316-317`; bulk: `admin-products-list-page.component.ts:36` → `facade.ts:175-178`).
- `[Admin-operator]` Order bulk-delete removes selected orders permanently with zero confirmation — destroys financial records in one click (`features/admin/orders/pages/admin-orders-list-page.component.html:48` → `admin-orders.facade.ts:134-140`).
- `[Admin-operator]` The review bulk-action button is labeled **"archive"** (implying reversible) but actually calls `deleteReview`, which permanently splices the review out — no confirmation dialog (`moderation/pages/admin-reviews-list-page.component.html:56` → `admin-moderation.facade.ts:148-154` → `admin-moderation-local.gateway.ts:94-97`).
- `[Admin-operator]` Category bulk-delete has no confirmation, inconsistent with the same module's single-delete flow, which does confirm (`categories/pages/admin-categories-list-page.component.ts:40` vs `76-84`).
- `[QA]` The order-detail "Change status" dropdown bypasses the confirm-gated Cancel/Refund buttons next to it — picking `cancelled`/`refunded` from the dropdown applies immediately with no confirmation (`orders/pages/admin-order-detail-page.component.html:49` vs `55-57`).
- `[QA]` Terminal order statuses aren't enforced in the UI — the status dropdown stays active after an order reaches `cancelled`/`refunded`, so a terminal order can be silently moved back to any other status (`admin-order-detail-page.component.html:47-58`).
- `[Accessibility / Engineering]` Confirmation UX is implemented three inconsistent ways across the app: native `window.confirm()`/`alert()` (Categories, Orders cancel/refund, Users suspend), a themed dialog component (Media Library only), and nothing at all (Products, Orders/Reviews bulk-delete) (`categories/pages/admin-categories-list-page.component.ts:78,81`; `orders/pages/admin-order-detail-page.component.ts:80,86`; `users/pages/admin-users-page.component.ts:43`; vs `features/backoffice/media/media-library-page.component.html:126-140`).

### Missing/incorrect loading, empty, error states

- `[QA]` Order-detail and Customer-detail pages collapse "loading," "not found," and "error" into one static "Loading…" string shown forever if the record isn't found or the request errors — `loadDetail` has no `error` handler (`orders/pages/admin-order-detail-page.component.html:89-91`, facade `admin-orders.facade.ts:98-100`; `customers/pages/admin-customer-detail-page.component.html:51-53`).
- `[QA]` Products, Categories, Orders, Customers, and Transactions facades swallow load errors into an empty array with no distinct `error` signal — a genuine API failure renders as "No results found" rather than an error-with-retry state, unlike Users/Monitoring/Analytics, which do track error separately (`products/facade/admin-products.facade.ts:101-114`; `customers/facade/admin-customers.facade.ts:42-54`; `transactions/facade/admin-transactions.facade.ts:15-29`).
- `[QA]` The Reports page never checks `facade.error()` even though `AdminAnalyticsFacade` exposes it — on load failure it silently renders 0%/0 stats instead of an error message (`admin/reports/pages/admin-reports-page.component.html:1-32`, facade `admin-analytics.facade.ts:41,77`).
- `[Engineering]` Save/mutate calls across Products, Categories, and Users subscribe with only a `next` handler — a failed save/delete/role-change fails completely silently with no user-facing feedback (`products/facade/admin-products.facade.ts:305-314`; `categories/facade/admin-categories.facade.ts:314-332`; `users/facade/admin-users.facade.ts:35-50`).

### Fake/stubbed data presented as real

- `[Engineering / Product Owner]` Monitoring's security/audit events, queue depths, and webhook deliveries are entirely synthetic (seeded fake generators, hardcoded queue states, modulo-based fake webhook statuses) with no connection to any real backend, yet presented as a live security/audit surface (`monitoring/services/admin-monitoring-local.gateway.ts:14-92`).
- `[Admin-operator]` The Monitoring page loads once on construction with no polling/auto-refresh and no manual refresh control (only a retry-on-error button) (`monitoring/pages/admin-monitoring-page.component.ts:39-41`; template `:79`).
- `[Admin-operator]` The topbar global search input has no `(input)`/`(keyup.enter)` binding and no handler anywhere — it is entirely decorative (`shell/admin-layout.component.html:118`).
- `[Admin-operator]` The notification bell always opens a panel showing a static "no notifications" message — no notification data source is wired up at all (`shell/admin-layout.component.html:141-157`).
- `[Product Owner]` The Dashboard's "images without alt text" health check is hardcoded to `status: 'unknown'` with no code path that could ever resolve it — a permanent placeholder sitting alongside real, resolvable checks (`dashboard/facade/admin-dashboard.facade.ts:132`).
- `[Product Owner]` "Request Refund" doesn't touch any payment processor — it only flips `payment.status` to `refund_requested`; actually completing the refund means separately picking "refunded" from the unrelated status dropdown, with no workflow linking the two (`orders/services/admin-orders-local.gateway.ts:43-50`).

### Incomplete modules

- `[Product Owner]` Settings (`/backoffice/settings`) is fully routed and linked in nav but contains exactly one control (density toggle to localStorage) — no store/payment/tax/shipping/notification settings exist despite the nav entry implying a general settings page.
- `[Product Owner]` Seller Management's "Request Access" form submission is mocked with a bare `setTimeout` — no backend call exists, "Learn more" is static copy. Confirms [Product Owner item 5-8](#as-product-owner--business) are still accurate against current source.
- `[Product Owner]` Customer-detail "Notes" card always shows a static "notes unavailable" message — no way to add customer notes at all, unlike Orders, which supports both customer-facing and internal notes (`customers/pages/admin-customer-detail-page.component.html:28-31`).
- `[Product Owner]` "Reports" duplicates "Analytics" 1:1 — both consume the same facade and independently re-run the same nested aggregation — but Reports exposes only 3 CSV export buttons. Unclear differentiation between the two nav entries for an operator (`reports/pages/admin-reports-page.component.ts:15-20`).

### Missing validation

- `[QA / Product Owner]` The product create/edit form has **zero client-side validation** — no required-field checks (name, price, SKU), no min/max on price/discount/quantity. A completely empty or negative-priced product can be saved with no warning (`products/components/admin-product-form.component.ts`, entire file; save path `admin-products.facade.ts:305-314`).

### Performance

- `[Performance]` `AdminAnalyticsFacade.load()` chains four nested subscriptions (orders → products → categories → reviews) instead of `forkJoin`/`combineLatest`, with no cancellation of in-flight requests — rapidly toggling the date-range filter can let a stale response overwrite a newer one (`analytics/facade/admin-analytics.facade.ts:65-130`).
- `[Performance]` Dashboard-stat computations across Orders, Customers, Transactions, and Analytics each independently re-fetch the entire order list with `pageSize: 100000` rather than sharing one cached read (`orders/facade/admin-orders.facade.ts:166-169`; `customers/facade/admin-customers.facade.ts:44,57`; `analytics/facade/admin-analytics.facade.ts:79,92`).

### Engineering / tech-debt

- `[Engineering]` `AdminCustomersFacade.buildCustomers()` treats `customerOrders[0]` as the customer's "latest" order with no local sort — correctness depends entirely on the orders gateway happening to already return descending-by-`createdAt` order; swapping in a differently-ordered real gateway would silently corrupt "last order" with no compiler or runtime signal (`customers/facade/admin-customers.facade.ts:24-39` vs `orders/services/admin-orders-local.gateway.ts:20`).
- `[Engineering]` Bulk operations (Orders, Categories, Products, Moderation) fire N independent gateway calls in a loop with no `forkJoin`, no per-item error handling, and no aggregate loading indicator — one failed item in a batch gives the user no signal at all (`moderation/facade/admin-moderation.facade.ts:133-154`; `orders/facade/admin-orders.facade.ts:119-140`; `categories/facade/admin-categories.facade.ts:391-397`).

### Doc-drift confirmed against the Seller-Management audit

- `[Engineering]` `Seller-Management-Backoffice-Readiness-Audit.md` stated Settings "No route exists... Skipped, nothing to audit" — now stale: `/backoffice/settings` is a real routed page with no `comingSoon` flag (`shell/admin-nav.model.ts:48`, `app.routes.ts:266-274`).
- `[Engineering]` Since that audit, `AdminOrder` and `AdminProduct` have both gained an explicit, unread `sellerId?: string` groundwork field — partially updates the audit's "no injection point" framing at the order level, though its core point (no per-item seller attribution on `AdminOrderItem`) remains accurate (`orders/models/admin-order.model.ts:54-59`; `products/models/admin-product.model.ts:115-120`).
