Built with --stats-json and read the esbuild metafile instead of guessing.
@angular/compiler was 495,831 bytes of a 1.5 MB main chunk - the JIT
compiler, in an AOT production build, 33% of everything an anonymous
visitor downloads.
src/main.ts imported it deliberately, with a comment explaining that
@marketplaces/auth shipped plain tsc output carrying no Ivy metadata, so
Angular JIT-compiled its classes at runtime and bootstrap threw without
it.
That comment was stale. The package is 0.2.0, built with ng-packagr,
module: dist/fesm2022/marketplaces-auth.mjs - proper Angular Package
Format, partial-compiled (ɵɵngDeclareInjectable), linked at consumer
build time. Nothing needs JIT.
Verified against the production bundle served statically, not just a
green build: the failure mode this guarded was a runtime throw, so a
successful compile proves nothing. Angular 22.0.8 bootstrapped, the
router resolved /ru, and the app rendered its own "server unavailable"
screen - meaning DI, HttpClient and the full interceptor chain ran. That
chain injects AuthService from @marketplaces/auth, the exact class the
old comment named. Zero JIT or compiler errors; the only console output
was the expected 404s from having no backend behind a static server.
Initial bundle 1.55 MB -> 1.04 MB raw, 323.58 kB -> 215.45 kB transfer.
Budget ratchet lowered 1.6MB -> 1.1MB, which is now also what stops the
import being re-added.
Next lever, deliberately not taken here: i18n/ru.ts is 290 kB, eager,
while en/hy are already lazy. TranslateService has the loader plumbing
and languageGuard already awaits a preload, so it is mechanically small -
but it adds a round-trip before first paint for the majority language,
which is a product tradeoff, not a cleanup. Roughly a 750 kB bundle once
someone decides.
256 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
server-setup.sh configured ufw and stopped there, which leaves SSH open
to unlimited password guessing and the kernel on defaults that are wrong
for an internet-facing host.
Adds three drop-in files, so a re-run replaces its own config and never
edits a distro file in place:
/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-marketplaces-hardening.conf
password and keyboard-interactive auth off, root key-only,
no agent/X11 forwarding, MaxAuthTries 3, 30s login grace
/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/marketplaces.local
sshd, nginx-http-auth, nginx-bad-request; 5 in 10m, 1h ban
/etc/sysctl.d/99-marketplaces-hardening.conf
no redirects or source routing, rp_filter, SYN cookies,
forwarding off, restricted kernel pointers and dmesg
Both accounts on the host are key-only by construction - the deploy user
is created with no password at all - so disabling password auth cannot
lock anyone out. It only closes guessing against a credential nobody
intended to exist.
The sshd block runs `sshd -t` first and removes its own drop-in if the
test fails. A bad sshd config that takes effect on a remote box is how
people lock themselves out permanently.
DEPLOYMENT.md §3.2 documents all three plus the post-provision checks.
Not copied from the reference implementation: its hardcoded server IP.
Kept as-is because ours is already better: add-domain.sh pre-checks the
DNS A record and runs nginx -t before and after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The VK-only scaffolding had a shape problem worth fixing before anything
was built on it: completeCallback(code, codeVerifier) took the PKCE
verifier from the client, which forces the browser to generate and hold
it. We are a confidential client - a browser-held verifier buys nothing
and adds a place to steal it from.
Replaces the four vk-id-* files with a provider-agnostic surface:
getAuthorizeUrl(provider, returnTo?)
listIdentities()
unlink(provider)
completeCallback is gone entirely. The backend mints and stores state and
code_verifier single-use for 10 minutes, handles the provider's callback
itself, issues the session cookie and redirects. VK and Yandex differ
only in a path segment, because everything that actually differs between
them - PKCE handling, VK's device_id, Yandex's Basic-auth exchange -
lives backend-side.
vk-id-login becomes social-login-button with a provider input; adding
Yandex to the UI is an input value, not new code. Adds yandex_id to
ExternalIdentityProvider, plus optional email/phone/displayName since VK
frequently returns no email.
social-identity-gateway.spec.ts (5 tests) asserts the requests carry no
code_verifier and no client_secret, so reintroducing a browser-held
verifier fails the build rather than passing review.
PHASE-8 §2 rewritten to match: the four endpoints, backend-owned state
and verifier, UNIQUE (provider, providerUserId) with conflict routed to
controlled resolution rather than a silent rebind, per-tenant OAuth app
config under the Track S §4.2 envelope, and both providers' full endpoint
sets. Two things recorded there because they are expensive to discover
later: VK's callback returns device_id alongside code and the token
exchange fails without it, and both providers validate redirect_uri
against an exact registered list - which a multi-tenant platform cannot
satisfy without a central identity host (FH-0.1, still undecided).
256 tests pass. Build green, boundaries and cycles green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Writes the 14 harvested mechanisms from FORK-ANALYSIS-2026-08-21.md into
the backend contracts. Each section is dated 2026-08-21 and tagged FH-*
so any wording traces back to why it is worded that way.
The through-line: several contracts stated correctness as behaviour
("the webhook must be idempotent"). Behaviour written as an if-statement
gets deleted by a refactor and the failure mode is a double charge. These
sections restate it as schema and mechanism.
PHASE-3 3.1 conditional-write reservation, 409 on zero rows, cart-wide
rollback, 15 min TTL
3.2 InventoryMovement append-only journal with resultingAvailable
6 bulk import idempotent by SKU, rollback while unsold
6a digital code pools, revealed only when paid
PHASE-7 5 unique constraints for payment idempotency and webhook
replay, insert-first handling, signature over raw body,
24h poll as reconciliation not primary
TRACK-S 2.1 session model - 32 bytes stored as SHA-256 only, HttpOnly,
one cookie per contour, Argon2id params, mandatory TOTP
2.2 origin allowlist ahead of routing on every cookie mutation
4.2 AES-256-GCM envelope for stored secrets, HMAC fingerprints
8a order manager as a separate contour, scoped by membership
rows rather than by configuration
PHASE-9 5.1 revision immutability, version = max+1, pointer flipped
in-transaction, operational state does not travel
5.2 clone carry / no-carry list, inventory to zero
5.3 signed read-only preview, non-GET 404s while previewing
6 host normalization, verifiedAt required, cache invalidation
PHASE-10 3a server re-runs the editor's validation, clamp-and-fallback
PHASE-2 3.1 order publicToken, snapshot completeness, never updated
FH-2.12 rejected on the merits: our marketplace lifecycle state machine
is richer than theirs, adopting it would be a downgrade. Recorded in the
TODO so it is not raised again.
Also adds BACKEND-HANDOFF.md sections 0 and 0a - nine falsifiable
invariants as a release gate, each cross-referenced to the contract that
specifies it, plus PR and release discipline. And ADR-0006 recording what
we take, what we reject, what we keep because ours is better, and the
organizational question it deliberately does not settle.
No implementation changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bundle budget was warning-only: initial warning 700 kB, error 1.8 MB.
Measured today the initial bundle is 1.55 MB raw / 324.58 kB transfer -
up from the 1.15 MB measured on 11 August, so it had been growing with
nothing to stop it.
Lowers maximumError to 1.6 MB. That is a ratchet, not a target: just
above today's size so the bundle cannot grow, with the 700 kB warning
left in place as the goal. Lower it each time the number comes down.
Adds scripts/ci/scan-bundle.sh (npm run scan:bundle), run in CI after
the build. Seven patterns: both provider auth headers, the partner ID
shape, client_secret, private key blocks, AWS keys, Telegram bot
tokens. The legacy payment code that put credentials in the browser is
already deleted; this is what stops it coming back. Verified in both
directions - clean against the real dist, exit 1 against a planted
credential.
Measurement also corrected two assumptions recorded in the harvest
TODO: admin and editor code is already lazy-loaded, so the initial
bundle is main alone rather than a deployable-split problem; and mock
gateway fixtures do reach production chunks, which is now filed as
FH-E.6 with the cause identified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
detectLocation() fetched http://ip-api.com over plaintext from an HTTPS
storefront. Browsers block mixed active content, so the request never
completed and auto-detect only ever took its error branch - region
detection has been dead in production, not merely insecure. The attempt
also handed every visitor's IP to a third party from the page itself.
Geo now resolves through the tenant API at {baseUrl}/geo/resolve, the
same base /regions already uses. The server reads the client IP; the
browser sends nothing and receives no third-party payload.
The endpoint is specified in BACKEND-API-REFERENCE.md and is not built
yet. Until it ships the client falls back to the manual region picker -
identical to the behaviour production already had.
Adds location.service.spec.ts: geo goes to the tenant API, no request
leaves that origin or uses http://, failure degrades to the manual
picker, and detection is not retried once attempted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deep analysis of marketplaces-main.zip (hub.numus.cc/numus/marketplaces).
Findings:
- Not a fork of us. Separate platform monorepo (NestJS + Postgres +
2 Angular apps + infra) sharing an older dexarmarket ancestor.
- Our repo is vendored inside it as reference/parallel-frontend/,
SHA-256 pinned, dated 11 Aug 2026, classified "reference, not production".
- Zero VK/Yandex/OAuth code anywhere in their source. Their only
customer login is Telegram, proxied to an external service.
- They lead on backend truth and ops; we lead on frontend depth,
tests, e2e, and framework currency.
Three of their audit findings are still live in our code and are
defects, not just posture: plaintext ip-api.com call from an HTTPS
origin (mixed content, region detect silently dead), unvalidated
bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl on a bank URL rendered in an iframe,
and provider credentials plus a partner ID literal in the bundle.
Adds:
- docs/FORK-ANALYSIS-2026-08-21.md - full comparison, their audit of
us assessed line by line, and a VK ID + Yandex ID design.
- docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-21-fork-harvest-design.md - working
brief, five lanes, four waves, scope and rejection rules.
- docs/FORK-HARVEST-TODO.md - 42 items with effort, dependencies and
acceptance criteria. Improvements only; nothing regresses our
Angular version, test count, or architecture governance.
No implementation changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
