Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
sdarbinyan
cf17b0b6c6 feat(identity): provider-agnostic social login, VK ID + Yandex ID (FH-4.1, FH-4.2)
The VK-only scaffolding had a shape problem worth fixing before anything
was built on it: completeCallback(code, codeVerifier) took the PKCE
verifier from the client, which forces the browser to generate and hold
it. We are a confidential client - a browser-held verifier buys nothing
and adds a place to steal it from.

Replaces the four vk-id-* files with a provider-agnostic surface:

  getAuthorizeUrl(provider, returnTo?)
  listIdentities()
  unlink(provider)

completeCallback is gone entirely. The backend mints and stores state and
code_verifier single-use for 10 minutes, handles the provider's callback
itself, issues the session cookie and redirects. VK and Yandex differ
only in a path segment, because everything that actually differs between
them - PKCE handling, VK's device_id, Yandex's Basic-auth exchange -
lives backend-side.

vk-id-login becomes social-login-button with a provider input; adding
Yandex to the UI is an input value, not new code. Adds yandex_id to
ExternalIdentityProvider, plus optional email/phone/displayName since VK
frequently returns no email.

social-identity-gateway.spec.ts (5 tests) asserts the requests carry no
code_verifier and no client_secret, so reintroducing a browser-held
verifier fails the build rather than passing review.

PHASE-8 §2 rewritten to match: the four endpoints, backend-owned state
and verifier, UNIQUE (provider, providerUserId) with conflict routed to
controlled resolution rather than a silent rebind, per-tenant OAuth app
config under the Track S §4.2 envelope, and both providers' full endpoint
sets. Two things recorded there because they are expensive to discover
later: VK's callback returns device_id alongside code and the token
exchange fails without it, and both providers validate redirect_uri
against an exact registered list - which a multi-tenant platform cannot
satisfy without a central identity host (FH-0.1, still undecided).

256 tests pass. Build green, boundaries and cycles green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 13:15:26 +04:00
sdarbinyan
ec6760ac65 docs: backend contracts for Phases 8-10 (identity/messaging, tenant registry, content modules)
- Phase 8: Customer/ExternalIdentity/ContactChannel, VK ID OAuth 2.1/PKCE
  built first per Sprint 0.1 ("do all after vk"), then OTP, then MAX/
  Telegram bot linking, then the Notification Orchestrator + Delivery
  Conversation State Machine. Hard rule carried through: bots never touch
  financial statuses, only delivery fields via a dedicated Delivery Service.
- Phase 9: Marketplace/MarketplaceDomain/MarketplaceFeatureSet/
  MarketplaceRevision, full Hostinger DNS automation sequence (snapshot
  before change, never touch MX/SPF/DKIM/DMARC/CAA), lifecycle state
  machine that must expose its own blocker on every transition, publish
  model with orders/payments/inventory explicitly excluded from revisions.
- Phase 10: Gorbushka-class content entities (Shop/Service/Floor/
  SchemePin/RentListing/News/Lead/MallSettings), explicitly lowest
  priority and gated on Commerce Core being real first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 23:05:39 +04:00