Adds published: boolean to the bootstrap wire contract. ConfigService
swaps to a new DEFAULT_BOOTSTRAP constant (all feature flags on, generic
branding/theme/pages) whenever the backend reports published: false, so
an unpublished marketplace renders a working demo instead of a blank or
broken page. Missing published field stays backward compatible (treated
as true). Documents the brand bootstrap wire shape for backend/ops use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Collapses the entire docs/backend/ set - Phase 1-10, Track A/S, the
partner API, the two handoffs, the frontend surface inventory, and the
harvest requirements - into a single source of truth,
docs/backend/BACKEND-INTEGRATION.md.
Every contract's entities, endpoints, and invariants are preserved,
reorganised by domain rather than by sprint. The nine release
invariants, the FH-* harvest mechanisms, the RBAC/audit/secrets
cross-cutting rules, the tenant-routing infra contract, the 15
acceptance tests, build order, dev setup, and open decisions are all in
the one file, with a change log (§14) at the bottom.
The file opens with the maintenance rule: any new backend need, contract
change, or shipped item updates this file in the same change - the
affected section and the change log. No new backend .md files.
Inbound links from BACKEND-API-REFERENCE, the ADRs, the fork docs,
DEPLOYMENT, PACKAGES-USAGE, the delivery plan, and e2e/README are
repointed at the single doc (section anchors collapse to the file; the
prose section refs remain as context). Also recorded the rule in the
repo CLAUDE.md.
17 backend docs removed, 1 added. No implementation changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Reconcile tenant API domains step ran on every push to main. On the
production host that is actively harmful: api.gorbushka.market already has
a hand-written vhost, and configure-api-domain.sh writes its own file per
domain - so the step would hand nginx a second server block for a
server_name that already has one and re-run certbot against a live API,
once per deploy. Shipping frontend files needs none of it. Gate it behind
a workflow_dispatch input, off by default, for standing up a NEW base
domain.
This also shrinks the secrets a normal deploy requires to four
(DEPLOY_HOST, DEPLOY_USER, DEPLOY_SSH_KEY, DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS);
STOREFRONT_DOMAINS, CERTBOT_EMAIL and BACKEND_UPSTREAM are now read only
on the opt-in path.
Document the production host as it actually is: provisioned by hand before
server-setup.sh existed, per-domain vhosts rooted at
/var/www/dexarmarket/browser, which is now a symlink to
/srv/marketplaces/current/frontend. Before 2026-08-22 it pointed straight
at a pinned release with no `current` in between, so releases 14d46ce and
98c39f6 uploaded successfully and were never served.
HARVEST-BACKEND-REQUIREMENTS.md - single index the backend builds the
fork harvest from, so the FH-* mechanisms are not scattered across nine
phase contracts:
- the nine release invariants (the acceptance gate)
- every FH-* requirement with its exact mechanism and phase-contract
reference, grouped by area (correctness core, sessions/access,
tenancy/publish/content, identity, operations)
- 15 acceptance tests mapped to the invariant each guards
- build order, and what the frontend already delivered so the backend
builds to a known target rather than guessing
Linked from the backend README index.
No implementation changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Audited all 21 localStorage users against the "localStorage as source of
truth" objection. It was already false almost everywhere:
- Every admin facade (products, categories, orders, moderation,
dashboard) uses localStorage only for view preferences - viewMode,
density, visibleColumns, expandedIds, sort. Entity CRUD goes through
the API gateways.
- currency-rates.service already removed its localStorage-typed rates.
- language, location region, search history, the anonymous session id,
admin preferences - all legitimate cache/preference.
- The editor already shows an "unsaved local draft restored" banner
(draftRestored -> save bar), which is the recovery-cache indicator this
item called for.
One real gap remains and it is backend-blocked: project-editor
publish() applies config to the in-memory runtime and saves the draft to
localStorage, then declares itself published - no server round-trip,
because the PHASE-9 §5 revision API does not exist yet. Marked precisely
in publish() with the required behaviour (await the server, only then
mark published) and cross-referenced to the contract.
Nothing to rip out: the codebase was already at the target state
everywhere the backend exists to support it.
262 tests pass. Boundaries green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
FH-4.7 - AccountIdentitiesComponent under
features/website/account/identities/. Lists linked identities from
GET /me/identities, offers attach buttons only for OAuth providers not
already linked (reusing SocialLoginButtonComponent), detaches through
unlink(). Refuses to detach the last remaining identity - it is the only
way back in - with the control disabled and an explanatory title, matching
the backend's last-identity 409. Loading / error / ready states; a load
failure surfaces an error rather than rendering an empty account, and a
slot carries the identity-conflict message from PHASE-8 §2.3. 6 unit tests.
Not wired into a route: the storefront has no customer account area yet
and no live OAuth application to authorize against (FH-0.1). This is the
surface both depend on, buildable and tested now.
FH-4.6 (client + contract) - the gateway now separates the two provider
sets. SocialProvider (vk | yandex) is what has an OAuth authorize
redirect; ExternalIdentityProvider (adds telegram | max) is what can be
listed and unlinked. unlink() widened to the latter so Telegram detaches
through the same path as VK, with no second code path. The dev local
gateway seeds a Telegram identity so the linking screen is exercisable
before any real provider exists.
PHASE-8 §2.6 specifies the backend migration: a Telegram login writes an
ExternalIdentity row under the same uniqueness and identity-conflict rule
as VK, appears in /me/identities, is removable subject to the
last-identity 409, and keeps customer (marketplace_session) and admin
(bo_session) sessions as distinct cookies - closing the shared
customer/admin Telegram session the audit flagged. The identity row and
the messaging BotConversationBinding stay separate records.
FH-4.8 - PHASE-8 §3 now states email/phone OTP's position explicitly:
recovery when a linked messenger is unreachable and an addable second
factor, never the primary login, and one more identity on the same
customer rather than a parallel account.
262 tests pass. Build green, boundaries and cycles green, bundle scan clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Built with --stats-json and read the esbuild metafile instead of guessing.
@angular/compiler was 495,831 bytes of a 1.5 MB main chunk - the JIT
compiler, in an AOT production build, 33% of everything an anonymous
visitor downloads.
src/main.ts imported it deliberately, with a comment explaining that
@marketplaces/auth shipped plain tsc output carrying no Ivy metadata, so
Angular JIT-compiled its classes at runtime and bootstrap threw without
it.
That comment was stale. The package is 0.2.0, built with ng-packagr,
module: dist/fesm2022/marketplaces-auth.mjs - proper Angular Package
Format, partial-compiled (ɵɵngDeclareInjectable), linked at consumer
build time. Nothing needs JIT.
Verified against the production bundle served statically, not just a
green build: the failure mode this guarded was a runtime throw, so a
successful compile proves nothing. Angular 22.0.8 bootstrapped, the
router resolved /ru, and the app rendered its own "server unavailable"
screen - meaning DI, HttpClient and the full interceptor chain ran. That
chain injects AuthService from @marketplaces/auth, the exact class the
old comment named. Zero JIT or compiler errors; the only console output
was the expected 404s from having no backend behind a static server.
Initial bundle 1.55 MB -> 1.04 MB raw, 323.58 kB -> 215.45 kB transfer.
Budget ratchet lowered 1.6MB -> 1.1MB, which is now also what stops the
import being re-added.
Next lever, deliberately not taken here: i18n/ru.ts is 290 kB, eager,
while en/hy are already lazy. TranslateService has the loader plumbing
and languageGuard already awaits a preload, so it is mechanically small -
but it adds a round-trip before first paint for the majority language,
which is a product tradeoff, not a cleanup. Roughly a 750 kB bundle once
someone decides.
256 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
server-setup.sh configured ufw and stopped there, which leaves SSH open
to unlimited password guessing and the kernel on defaults that are wrong
for an internet-facing host.
Adds three drop-in files, so a re-run replaces its own config and never
edits a distro file in place:
/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-marketplaces-hardening.conf
password and keyboard-interactive auth off, root key-only,
no agent/X11 forwarding, MaxAuthTries 3, 30s login grace
/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/marketplaces.local
sshd, nginx-http-auth, nginx-bad-request; 5 in 10m, 1h ban
/etc/sysctl.d/99-marketplaces-hardening.conf
no redirects or source routing, rp_filter, SYN cookies,
forwarding off, restricted kernel pointers and dmesg
Both accounts on the host are key-only by construction - the deploy user
is created with no password at all - so disabling password auth cannot
lock anyone out. It only closes guessing against a credential nobody
intended to exist.
The sshd block runs `sshd -t` first and removes its own drop-in if the
test fails. A bad sshd config that takes effect on a remote box is how
people lock themselves out permanently.
DEPLOYMENT.md §3.2 documents all three plus the post-provision checks.
Not copied from the reference implementation: its hardcoded server IP.
Kept as-is because ours is already better: add-domain.sh pre-checks the
DNS A record and runs nginx -t before and after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The VK-only scaffolding had a shape problem worth fixing before anything
was built on it: completeCallback(code, codeVerifier) took the PKCE
verifier from the client, which forces the browser to generate and hold
it. We are a confidential client - a browser-held verifier buys nothing
and adds a place to steal it from.
Replaces the four vk-id-* files with a provider-agnostic surface:
getAuthorizeUrl(provider, returnTo?)
listIdentities()
unlink(provider)
completeCallback is gone entirely. The backend mints and stores state and
code_verifier single-use for 10 minutes, handles the provider's callback
itself, issues the session cookie and redirects. VK and Yandex differ
only in a path segment, because everything that actually differs between
them - PKCE handling, VK's device_id, Yandex's Basic-auth exchange -
lives backend-side.
vk-id-login becomes social-login-button with a provider input; adding
Yandex to the UI is an input value, not new code. Adds yandex_id to
ExternalIdentityProvider, plus optional email/phone/displayName since VK
frequently returns no email.
social-identity-gateway.spec.ts (5 tests) asserts the requests carry no
code_verifier and no client_secret, so reintroducing a browser-held
verifier fails the build rather than passing review.
PHASE-8 §2 rewritten to match: the four endpoints, backend-owned state
and verifier, UNIQUE (provider, providerUserId) with conflict routed to
controlled resolution rather than a silent rebind, per-tenant OAuth app
config under the Track S §4.2 envelope, and both providers' full endpoint
sets. Two things recorded there because they are expensive to discover
later: VK's callback returns device_id alongside code and the token
exchange fails without it, and both providers validate redirect_uri
against an exact registered list - which a multi-tenant platform cannot
satisfy without a central identity host (FH-0.1, still undecided).
256 tests pass. Build green, boundaries and cycles green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Writes the 14 harvested mechanisms from FORK-ANALYSIS-2026-08-21.md into
the backend contracts. Each section is dated 2026-08-21 and tagged FH-*
so any wording traces back to why it is worded that way.
The through-line: several contracts stated correctness as behaviour
("the webhook must be idempotent"). Behaviour written as an if-statement
gets deleted by a refactor and the failure mode is a double charge. These
sections restate it as schema and mechanism.
PHASE-3 3.1 conditional-write reservation, 409 on zero rows, cart-wide
rollback, 15 min TTL
3.2 InventoryMovement append-only journal with resultingAvailable
6 bulk import idempotent by SKU, rollback while unsold
6a digital code pools, revealed only when paid
PHASE-7 5 unique constraints for payment idempotency and webhook
replay, insert-first handling, signature over raw body,
24h poll as reconciliation not primary
TRACK-S 2.1 session model - 32 bytes stored as SHA-256 only, HttpOnly,
one cookie per contour, Argon2id params, mandatory TOTP
2.2 origin allowlist ahead of routing on every cookie mutation
4.2 AES-256-GCM envelope for stored secrets, HMAC fingerprints
8a order manager as a separate contour, scoped by membership
rows rather than by configuration
PHASE-9 5.1 revision immutability, version = max+1, pointer flipped
in-transaction, operational state does not travel
5.2 clone carry / no-carry list, inventory to zero
5.3 signed read-only preview, non-GET 404s while previewing
6 host normalization, verifiedAt required, cache invalidation
PHASE-10 3a server re-runs the editor's validation, clamp-and-fallback
PHASE-2 3.1 order publicToken, snapshot completeness, never updated
FH-2.12 rejected on the merits: our marketplace lifecycle state machine
is richer than theirs, adopting it would be a downgrade. Recorded in the
TODO so it is not raised again.
Also adds BACKEND-HANDOFF.md sections 0 and 0a - nine falsifiable
invariants as a release gate, each cross-referenced to the contract that
specifies it, plus PR and release discipline. And ADR-0006 recording what
we take, what we reject, what we keep because ours is better, and the
organizational question it deliberately does not settle.
No implementation changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bundle budget was warning-only: initial warning 700 kB, error 1.8 MB.
Measured today the initial bundle is 1.55 MB raw / 324.58 kB transfer -
up from the 1.15 MB measured on 11 August, so it had been growing with
nothing to stop it.
Lowers maximumError to 1.6 MB. That is a ratchet, not a target: just
above today's size so the bundle cannot grow, with the 700 kB warning
left in place as the goal. Lower it each time the number comes down.
Adds scripts/ci/scan-bundle.sh (npm run scan:bundle), run in CI after
the build. Seven patterns: both provider auth headers, the partner ID
shape, client_secret, private key blocks, AWS keys, Telegram bot
tokens. The legacy payment code that put credentials in the browser is
already deleted; this is what stops it coming back. Verified in both
directions - clean against the real dist, exit 1 against a planted
credential.
Measurement also corrected two assumptions recorded in the harvest
TODO: admin and editor code is already lazy-loaded, so the initial
bundle is main alone rather than a deployable-split problem; and mock
gateway fixtures do reach production chunks, which is now filed as
FH-E.6 with the cause identified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
detectLocation() fetched http://ip-api.com over plaintext from an HTTPS
storefront. Browsers block mixed active content, so the request never
completed and auto-detect only ever took its error branch - region
detection has been dead in production, not merely insecure. The attempt
also handed every visitor's IP to a third party from the page itself.
Geo now resolves through the tenant API at {baseUrl}/geo/resolve, the
same base /regions already uses. The server reads the client IP; the
browser sends nothing and receives no third-party payload.
The endpoint is specified in BACKEND-API-REFERENCE.md and is not built
yet. Until it ships the client falls back to the manual region picker -
identical to the behaviour production already had.
Adds location.service.spec.ts: geo goes to the tenant API, no request
leaves that origin or uses http://, failure degrades to the manual
picker, and detection is not retried once attempted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verified zero remaining callers for each before deleting (grepped
src/app for every method name individually), not assumed from the
earlier commit's dead-code note.
Deleted from api.service.ts:
- createPayment() - legacy direct QR creation (POST {qrBaseUrl}/qr)
- createCartPayment() - legacy /cart payment creation, client-sent amount
- createPaymentIntent() - superseded by @marketplaces/payment's gateway
- checkCartPaymentStatus(), checkCartCardPaymentStatus(), checkPaymentStatus()
- legacy QR/card status polls, superseded by the same gateway
- resolvePaymentQrId/resolvePaymentQrUrl/resolvePaymentLink/
resolveBankPaymentUrl - QrCreateResponse field-normalization helpers,
no longer had a caller once the methods above were gone
- Types: QrCreateRequest, QrCreateResponse, CartPaymentRequest,
PaymentIntentRequest, QrDynamicStatusResponse
- Fields: qrBaseUrl, cartPaymentPartnerId - no longer read by anything
- Imports: HttpHeaders, environment - no longer used in this file
Did NOT touch createOrder() or createCheckoutSession() - both still have
live callers in cart.component.ts, confirmed before deciding what to keep.
cart.component.ts: corrected the createPaymentIntent() comment, which
referenced the deleted method/helper names, to name what actually got
deleted instead of what was merely "dead as of that commit."
docs/backend/FRONTEND-API-SURFACE-COMPLETE.md: moved the 4 now-deleted
QR/card endpoints out of the "still live" legacy table into a dated removal
note - the doc's own premise is "every endpoint this codebase currently
calls," so it was wrong to leave them listed as called once they weren't.
Legacy-undocumented count corrected 15->11, total 97->93.
Verified: production build succeeds (no dangling references), 247/247 unit
tests, arch:check clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deep analysis of marketplaces-main.zip (hub.numus.cc/numus/marketplaces).
Findings:
- Not a fork of us. Separate platform monorepo (NestJS + Postgres +
2 Angular apps + infra) sharing an older dexarmarket ancestor.
- Our repo is vendored inside it as reference/parallel-frontend/,
SHA-256 pinned, dated 11 Aug 2026, classified "reference, not production".
- Zero VK/Yandex/OAuth code anywhere in their source. Their only
customer login is Telegram, proxied to an external service.
- They lead on backend truth and ops; we lead on frontend depth,
tests, e2e, and framework currency.
Three of their audit findings are still live in our code and are
defects, not just posture: plaintext ip-api.com call from an HTTPS
origin (mixed content, region detect silently dead), unvalidated
bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl on a bank URL rendered in an iframe,
and provider credentials plus a partner ID literal in the bundle.
Adds:
- docs/FORK-ANALYSIS-2026-08-21.md - full comparison, their audit of
us assessed line by line, and a VK ID + Yandex ID design.
- docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-21-fork-harvest-design.md - working
brief, five lanes, four waves, scope and rejection rules.
- docs/FORK-HARVEST-TODO.md - 42 items with effort, dependencies and
acceptance criteria. Improvements only; nothing regresses our
Angular version, test count, or architecture governance.
No implementation changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Direct question caught a real gap: "everything is there? payment auth?"
The census only grepped src/app/ - auth moved into the external
@marketplaces/auth package this session, and its HTTP calls were never
captured. Seven real endpoints were silently absent from a doc that called
itself "complete":
- 3 Telegram QR/session endpoints (POST/GET/DELETE .../users/sessions) -
live today, customer and admin login share them, which is exactly why
every admin endpoint must independently verify authorization server-side
- 4 ed25519 admin challenge/response endpoints - specified in
BACKEND-HANDOFF.md §3 and the package's own auth-api.model.ts, but not
built server-side. Client shows backend-unavailable until they exist.
Added §0.3 stating plainly what actually connects auth to payment: there is
no separate payment login. Checkout, order pricing (§20), and partner
credentials (§16) each ride on whichever of the two sessions above is
active, or on the partner API's own separate signed-request auth (§6 of
that contract - unrelated to Telegram/ed25519, already built, not a gap).
The real payment gap is §1 (QR/card creation and polling, undocumented
anywhere), not auth.
Counts corrected: 51->54 specified, 90->97 total. Added item 0 to the
action list, ahead of everything else: the ed25519 endpoints are the single
most serious open issue named anywhere in docs/backend/, and every other
item on the list assumes a working admin session to authorize against.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Updates FRONTEND-API-SURFACE-COMPLETE.md to cover everything built after it
was first generated - this is the final version for this pass, not a
snapshot mid-way through.
Added, none of which existed in the doc before:
- §18: the 4 marketplace revision endpoints (create draft/validate/
publish/rollback) - built this session, missing from the census entirely.
Flags the same draft/validated/preview/published ambiguity already
documented in the model itself, so backend sees it without having to
read source.
- §19: RoutingContext as an optional field addition on GET
/api/admin/v2/orders/{id} - not a new endpoint, a response-shape ask.
- §20: order pricing-breakdown fields (unitPriceMinor, lineTotalMinor,
priceSnapshotId, discountMinor, fxQuoteId, deliveryMinor) feeding the new
total-formula panel. States plainly that the panel shows nothing rather
than a wrong number while these are absent.
- §21: 8 optional dashboard-metrics fields (GMV, conversion, moderation
queue, etc.) - explicitly labelled a genuine ask, not a confirmed
contract, since no spec exists for this endpoint at all (§15).
- §22: states directly that the frontend's new double-click guard does not
replace backend idempotency enforcement and was never meant to - closes
one UI race, does nothing for a retried request or a duplicate webhook.
Counts updated (47->51 specified, 86->90 total; +3 response-shape asks that
aren't new endpoints). Closing section states the one item genuinely
blocked pending a live backend (F60, the full acceptance-path E2E) so
nobody mistakes "frontend backlog complete" for "nothing left to build."
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Generated directly from source (every this.http.get/post/patch/put/delete
call across core/, features/admin/, api.service.ts) rather than written
from memory - a census, not a design doc.
47 already match an existing Phase/Track contract exactly. 24 are inferred
from this codebase's own REST conventions with no contract doc stating them
- each flagged in source at its call site, not just in this doc, so backend
sees the reasoning next to the code. 15 are legacy endpoints
(/category, /cart, /qr, /websession, ...) with no contract anywhere,
still live today.
Biggest concrete gap surfaced: three full admin domains (transactions,
monitoring, moderation) have real UI and real gateways calling
/api/admin/v2/{resource} by convention, with zero backend contract written
for any of them.
One real bug found and fixed while building this, not just flagged:
connector-api.gateway.ts's replay() called
POST /api/admin/v2/integrations/dead-letter/{id}/replay, omitting the
{connectorId} segment the contract's own path requires
(PHASE-4-CONNECTOR-FRAMEWORK-CONTRACT.md §7). Fixed the interface, both
gateway implementations, and the doc entry in the same pass - no callers
existed yet, so this shipped without ever being exercised by a UI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adding a domain was a manual per-domain script run. With domains arriving
continuously that does not hold, so certificate issuance is now automatic.
HTTP already needed no work: the nginx catch-all serves any Host and the SPA
resolves its tenant from that header. Only TLS needed a name-by-name step.
Two mechanisms:
- setup-wildcard-tls.sh issues one DNS-01 wildcard for *.<apex>, after which a
new tenant subdomain is live over HTTPS with zero certificate work.
- sync-domains.sh reconciles tenant-owned domains against a desired list on a
10-minute timer: issues what is missing, skips certificates with >30 days
left, skips names already covered by the wildcard, waits out unpropagated
DNS, and caps issuance per run so a bad source cannot burn the weekly ACME
budget.
Safety properties worth stating: a failed fetch of the desired list aborts the
run rather than reading as "remove every domain"; removing a domain disables
its server block but keeps the certificate, so re-adding is instant; malformed
hostnames are rejected before reaching certbot or an nginx server_name.
The source is pluggable - a file today, the Phase 9 domain registry once it
exists, whose MarketplaceDomain statuses already match what this needs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
There was no CD: pushing to main deployed nothing, and deploys were a manual
copy onto the server. This adds the missing half.
- .github/workflows/deploy.yml - build, upload to a per-commit release
directory, swap the symlink atomically, reload nginx, verify over HTTP.
The swap only happens after the upload is verified to contain index.html,
so a failed deploy leaves the previous release serving.
- scripts/deploy/server-setup.sh - idempotent one-time provisioning: nginx,
certbot, ufw, and a key-only deploy user whose sole sudo right is
"systemctl reload nginx".
- scripts/deploy/add-domain.sh - per-domain server block plus TLS issuance,
run once a domain's A record resolves to the server.
- docs/DEPLOYMENT.md - setup order, required CI secrets, rollback, limits.
Also adds .gitattributes: the shell scripts were being checked out with CRLF
endings, which makes bash fail on the shebang line on Linux.
Host keys are pinned via DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS rather than trusted on first use.
No credentials are committed; all four deploy secrets are supplied by CI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A partner integration request landed for programmatic merchant-hierarchy
management (Company/Project/Store/PaymentPoint). Built the answer generically:
partner-specific behaviour is a PartnerProfile config row, and no partner name
appears in any entity, field, endpoint or status value.
New:
- docs/backend/PARTNER-PROVISIONING-API-CONTRACT.md - hierarchy, idempotency,
node-scoped public-key credentials, TEST/LIVE partition, routing context
- docs/context/adrs/ADR-0003-generic-partner-provisioning-api.md
Amended, because the schema impact must land before Phase 1 is implemented:
- Phase 1 gains RoutingContext on CheckoutSession/PaymentIntent/Payment,
frozen at checkout-session creation and immutable after
- Phase 7 gains routing on Refund/ReconciliationRecord, plus the rule that
seller settlement splits happen after routing, never as a hierarchy level
- Phase 9 gains Company/Project above Marketplace and PaymentPoint below it,
with a backfill sequence for existing marketplaces
- Track S gains partner credentials: public key only, node-scoped authority,
rotation with overlap, immediate revoke, audit coverage
Also: Track P (P1-P10) in the delivery plan, and backend ownership closed as
answered across the contract set.
Card payment was checked, not added - qr and card both already ship in
cart.component.ts with separate create paths and status pollers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Verdaccio registry introduced earlier is unreachable from CI (listens on
127.0.0.1:4873 behind a firewall allowing only 80/443/SSH), which broke the
architecture-governance workflow - its npm ci step could no longer resolve
@marketplaces/auth.
Packages are now published to git release branches (release/auth,
release/payment in vitanovaPackages) whose root is the package itself, and
installed with git+<repo>#release/auth. No registry, token, tunnel, or CI
secret - anonymous git read is enough.
- package.json: git dependency; .npmrc removed (no scope mapping needed)
- vitanovaPackages release.yml rebuilt to force-push release branches
- ADR-0001 amended with the distribution change and why the registry lost
- BACKEND-HANDOFF: added the multi-tenancy section (hostname -> tenantKey ->
per-tenant bootstrap config), corrected the install and deploy notes, and
recorded that no CD pipeline exists
- PACKAGE-EXTRACTION / PACKAGES-USAGE rewritten for the git-branch flow
Verified: npm ci, arch:check:boundaries, ng build, 103/103 tests, all with
no credentials configured.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- docs/backend/BACKEND-HANDOFF.md: single entry point for a backend dev -
reading order, verified infrastructure state (nginx running, Postgres
inactive, no API on :8080, no TLS, no DNS automation, no CI runner),
auth surface, and the day-one setup that is still outstanding
- docs/PACKAGES-USAGE.md: install, required DI providers, full exported
API for both auth mechanisms, and how to ship a package change
- PACKAGE-EXTRACTION.md now covers build/release/infra only and points at
the usage guide; CI section reflects the two real workflows
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stood up Verdaccio (Docker, on the dev server) as a private npm registry
since no public registry/NPM_TOKEN exists yet. Published @marketplaces/auth
and @marketplaces/payment there, removed the local packages/ staging copy
from this repo, and switched marketplaces to install @marketplaces/auth
0.1.0 as a real npm dependency through the registry.
- .npmrc scopes @marketplaces to the Verdaccio registry (no token committed;
each installer/CI supplies its own via npm login or an env-injected token)
- Verified: fresh npm install, ng build, arch:check:boundaries, and full
test suite (103/103) all pass against the registry-installed package
- Registry is reachable only via SSH tunnel today (firewall allows 80/443/
SSH only); public/CI access is a follow-up decision, documented in
docs/PACKAGE-EXTRACTION.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ADR-0001: decision to extract auth/payment into shared @marketplaces/* packages
- Scaffold packages/auth, packages/payment; @marketplaces/auth now holds the real
telegram (customer+admin QR/session) and ed25519 (future admin challenge/response)
auth implementation, pushed to sources.vitanova.network/sdarbinyan/vitanovaPackages
- Rewire ~30 call sites to import from @marketplaces/auth; delete migrated originals
from core/auth, core/admin-auth, services/, models/
- Replace environment coupling with AUTH_API_URL/TELEGRAM_BOT_USERNAME injection
tokens and isDevMode(); wired as file:packages/auth pending registry publish
- Add TRACK-S §8: bootstrap per-marketplace admin login + marketplace-scoped
sub-admin invite/role endpoints
- Build, arch:check:boundaries, and full test suite (103/103) all green
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Track A: analytics event pipeline (traffic/catalog/commerce/operational/
quality events), synthetic-traffic separation enforced server-side by
environment/token, never a client-settable flag.
- Track S: 17-role/3-scope RBAC enforcement, audit log, secrets, rate
limiting, step-up auth - closes this session's most serious finding
(admin role model is decorative today, any authenticated admin has
full access regardless of assigned role).
- docs/backend/README.md: index of all 12 contract docs (Phases 1-10 +
2 tracks) in build order, plus what's deliberately excluded (namespace
migration, per-connector adapters, extra payment providers) and the
one thing still genuinely open across all of them - backend ownership.
- Cross-linked from BACKEND-API-REFERENCE.md and the delivery plan so the
index is discoverable from either entry point.
This closes out documentation for every phase/track in
PRODUCT-PLAN-v3.1-DELIVERY-PLAN.md that doesn't require a further business
decision. Nothing left undocumented on our side pending only implementation
and backend-ownership assignment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Phase 8: Customer/ExternalIdentity/ContactChannel, VK ID OAuth 2.1/PKCE
built first per Sprint 0.1 ("do all after vk"), then OTP, then MAX/
Telegram bot linking, then the Notification Orchestrator + Delivery
Conversation State Machine. Hard rule carried through: bots never touch
financial statuses, only delivery fields via a dedicated Delivery Service.
- Phase 9: Marketplace/MarketplaceDomain/MarketplaceFeatureSet/
MarketplaceRevision, full Hostinger DNS automation sequence (snapshot
before change, never touch MX/SPF/DKIM/DMARC/CAA), lifecycle state
machine that must expose its own blocker on every transition, publish
model with orders/payments/inventory explicitly excluded from revisions.
- Phase 10: Gorbushka-class content entities (Shop/Service/Floor/
SchemePin/RentListing/News/Lead/MallSettings), explicitly lowest
priority and gated on Commerce Core being real first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Phase 5: Seller Portal from scratch (zero backend bytes exist today) -
SellerOrganization/SellerUser/SellerMarketplaceMembership, all endpoints
scoped server-side to the unified-orders Fulfillment model from Phase 2.
- Phase 6: server-owned Cart/CartLine/CheckoutSession, extending Phase 1's
server-authoritative-amount contract into the cart itself. Replaces
localStorage/Telegram-CloudStorage cart persistence.
- Phase 7: Refund and ReconciliationRecord entities, settlement contract.
Flags additional payment providers (wallets/BNPL) as still an open
business decision - not blocking, schema is provider-agnostic already.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
