# Platform Super-Admin — Phase 1 Design **Status:** Approved **Date:** 2026-08-15 **Audience:** Internal admin & risk team ("super puper user") ## Purpose A cross-tenant view for internal admin/risk staff: see every project (store/tenant) on the platform, drill into one, and review its access list, audit log, admin edit history, and purchase history. Read-only in this phase. Editing project data / impersonating a store's admin ("edit all", with a per-change "notify this store's admin" toggle) is explicitly **out of scope** for this phase — see [Phase 2](#phase-2-out-of-scope-here) below. Phase 1 exists first because Phase 2's edit and notify plumbing depends on the tenant-context switch this phase builds. ## Non-goals (Phase 1) - No editing of any tenant's data. - No impersonation of a store's admin. - No "notify store admin" mechanism (that's a Phase 2 concern, tied to edit actions that don't exist yet). - No real backend — this repo is frontend-only; the backend contract is specified here for whoever owns that service, not implemented here. ## Architecture - New top-level feature module: `src/app/features/platform-admin/`. - New route tree `/platform-admin/**`, own shell/layout. **Not** nested under any tenant's `/admin/**` — a project is not "logged into" the way a store admin is. - New `platformAdminAuthGuard` (parallel to, but sharing no state with, `adminAuthGuard` in `core/admin-auth/admin-auth.guard.ts`). - `PlatformAuthService` — session/login state for the super-admin, backed by a `PlatformAuthGateway` interface: `login(credentials)`, `logout()`, `session()`. - `PlatformAuthLocalGateway` — dev-only implementation. Reads the expected credential from a **git-ignored** local file (`platform-auth.local-secret.ts`, added to `.gitignore`), never committed, never present in a production build path. - `PlatformAuthApiGateway` — later swap-in once the backend endpoint exists; same interface, no caller changes needed. ## Data model ```ts interface PlatformProjectSummary { id: UUID; name: string; slug: string; host: string; status: 'active' | 'suspended'; createdAt: number; adminCount: number; lastActivityAt: number | null; } interface PlatformProjectAccessEntry { userId: UUID; displayName: string; telegramUsername: string; roleId: string; // maps to existing AdminRole / ROLE_PERMISSIONS } type PlatformProjectHistoryEntry = | { kind: 'access'; tenantId: UUID; actorLabel: string; timestamp: number; summary: string } | { kind: 'edit'; tenantId: UUID; actorLabel: string; timestamp: number; summary: string } | { kind: 'purchase'; tenantId: UUID; actorLabel: string; timestamp: number; summary: string }; ``` - `PlatformProjectSummary[]` is produced by `PlatformProjectsGateway.list()`, which aggregates the existing `TenantConfig` fixture list plus derived stats. Mock gateway now; real aggregation is a backend concern later. - `PlatformProjectAccessEntry` reuses the existing `AdminRole` / `ROLE_PERMISSIONS` shape from `core/auth/models/permission.model.ts` — no new role system. - `PlatformProjectHistoryEntry` is a discriminated union covering all three history types the user asked for (access/audit, admin edit history, purchase history). Mock gateway simulates aggregation from existing per-tenant sources (e.g. the pattern in `AdminDashboardHistoryService`, `admin-transactions`); real aggregation is a backend concern. - Every super-admin **view** into a project also writes its own `kind: 'access'` entry (`platform.viewedProject`) — the risk team needs to know who looked at what, not just what changed. ## Components / pages - `PlatformProjectsListPageComponent` — table of all projects: name, status, admin count, last activity. Search/filter by status. - `PlatformProjectDetailPageComponent` — project overview stats, then tabs: - **Access** — `PlatformProjectAccessEntry[]` for that tenant. - **Audit Log** — `history` filtered to `kind: 'access'`. - **Edit History** — `history` filtered to `kind: 'edit'`. - **Purchase History** — `history` filtered to `kind: 'purchase'`. - All read-only in this phase. ## Security - `platformAdminAuthGuard` denies unless the session carries `platform.superadmin`. Like the existing `AdminPermissionsService`, the frontend check is defense-in-depth only — real enforcement must happen server-side once the backend endpoint exists. This is called out explicitly so it's never mistaken for the source of truth. - No credential is ever hardcoded in committed source. Dev-only credential lives in a git-ignored local file; production auth goes through the real backend endpoint below. - Session timeout for platform-admin: 15 minutes idle (shorter than regular tenant-admin sessions — higher-privilege session, smaller blast radius if a session is left open). - Every super-admin action (including read-only views) is itself audit-logged. - After implementation, run `/security-audit` on this feature specifically before it ships. ### Backend contract (for whoever owns that service — not implemented in this repo) Add to `BACKEND-API-REFERENCE.md`: - `POST /platform-admin/auth` — verifies a hashed credential server-side, returns a session token scoped to `platform.superadmin`. Never a plaintext credential check in a client-shipped artifact. - `GET /platform-admin/projects` — returns `PlatformProjectSummary[]`. - `GET /platform-admin/projects/:id/history` — returns `PlatformProjectHistoryEntry[]` for that tenant, paginated. ## Testing - Unit tests: `platformAdminAuthGuard`, `PlatformProjectsGateway` (mock), history-aggregation mapping logic. - No E2E in this phase — no real backend to exercise end-to-end yet. ## Phase 2 (out of scope here) A separate spec/plan cycle, once Phase 1 ships: - Full edit / impersonation: super-admin acts as a tenant's admin across every existing admin module (products, orders, categories, settings, etc.), reusing those modules under a tenant-context switch. - Per-edit-action **"notify this store's admin about this change"** checkbox, **default unchecked**. Uses the existing in-app notification pattern (the one behind `admin-order-watcher.service.ts`'s unread-badge flow) so the affected tenant's admin sees it in their notification feed. Unchecked-by-default matters: some super-admin edits are discreet technical fixes where alerting the store admin would be noise or a reputational concern, not every edit should ping them. - This phase needs the tenant-context switch and audit-logging plumbing this Phase 1 spec establishes, which is why it's sequenced after.