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Architecture Governance / architecture (push) Has been cancelled
The Verdaccio registry introduced earlier is unreachable from CI (listens on 127.0.0.1:4873 behind a firewall allowing only 80/443/SSH), which broke the architecture-governance workflow - its npm ci step could no longer resolve @marketplaces/auth. Packages are now published to git release branches (release/auth, release/payment in vitanovaPackages) whose root is the package itself, and installed with git+<repo>#release/auth. No registry, token, tunnel, or CI secret - anonymous git read is enough. - package.json: git dependency; .npmrc removed (no scope mapping needed) - vitanovaPackages release.yml rebuilt to force-push release branches - ADR-0001 amended with the distribution change and why the registry lost - BACKEND-HANDOFF: added the multi-tenancy section (hostname -> tenantKey -> per-tenant bootstrap config), corrected the install and deploy notes, and recorded that no CD pipeline exists - PACKAGE-EXTRACTION / PACKAGES-USAGE rewritten for the git-branch flow Verified: npm ci, arch:check:boundaries, ng build, 103/103 tests, all with no credentials configured. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
127 lines
8.0 KiB
Markdown
127 lines
8.0 KiB
Markdown
# Using `@marketplaces/auth` and `@marketplaces/payment`
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How to install and consume the shared packages in `marketplaces` or any other project. For *why* they exist see [ADR-0001](context/adrs/ADR-0001-extract-auth-and-payment-into-shared-marketplaces-packages.md); for how they are built and released see [PACKAGE-EXTRACTION.md](PACKAGE-EXTRACTION.md).
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## 1. Install
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Nothing to set up. The packages are installed straight over git from release branches in [vitanovaPackages](https://sources.vitanova.network/sdarbinyan/vitanovaPackages.git), where the repo root *is* the package:
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```json
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"@marketplaces/auth": "git+https://sources.vitanova.network/sdarbinyan/vitanovaPackages.git#release/auth"
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```
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That is already in `marketplaces`' `package.json`, so a fresh clone plus `npm install` just works — **no npm registry, no auth token, no SSH tunnel, no CI secret.** Anonymous git read is the only requirement.
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To add it to another project:
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```bash
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npm install "git+https://sources.vitanova.network/sdarbinyan/vitanovaPackages.git#release/auth"
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```
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**On pinning:** a branch ref tracks the tip, so `npm install` can pick up a new build. That is deliberate while the package churns. For reproducible installs, replace `#release/auth` with a commit SHA. See [ADR-0001](context/adrs/ADR-0001-extract-auth-and-payment-into-shared-marketplaces-packages.md) on blast radius.
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## 2. Required providers
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`@marketplaces/auth` has no knowledge of any specific app's environment config. It reads two injection tokens, both provided by the consuming app in `app.config.ts`:
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```ts
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import { AUTH_API_URL, TELEGRAM_BOT_USERNAME } from '@marketplaces/auth';
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import { environment } from '../environments/environment';
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export const appConfig: ApplicationConfig = {
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providers: [
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{ provide: AUTH_API_URL, useValue: environment.authApiUrl },
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{ provide: TELEGRAM_BOT_USERNAME, useValue: environment.telegramBot },
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// ...
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]
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};
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```
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| Token | Required | Meaning |
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|---|---|---|
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| `AUTH_API_URL` | yes | Base URL of the auth backend, e.g. `https://api.example.com`. Both auth mechanisms build their endpoints from this. |
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| `TELEGRAM_BOT_USERNAME` | no | Bot username for QR/deep-link login URLs. Falls back to a default if absent. |
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Missing `AUTH_API_URL` produces `NG0201: No provider found for InjectionToken @marketplaces/auth AUTH_API_URL` at the first injection — including in unit tests, where any `TestBed` that constructs a component touching auth must provide it:
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```ts
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TestBed.configureTestingModule({
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providers: [{ provide: AUTH_API_URL, useValue: 'https://test.local' }],
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});
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```
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## 3. What is in the package
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Two independent auth mechanisms. They deliberately share no state — a customer QR scan never authenticates an admin session or vice versa (distinct cookies, signals, guards, interceptors).
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### `telegram/` — live today
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Telegram QR/session auth against `{AUTH_API_URL}/users/sessions`. One backend endpoint set, used by both customer and admin login; only *storage* differs.
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| Export | What it is |
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|---|---|
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| `AuthService` | Customer session. Signals: `session`, `status`, `isAuthenticated`, `showLoginDialog`, `displayName`. Methods: `checkSession()`, `createWebSession()`, `requestLogin()`, `hideLogin()`, `logout()`, `onTelegramLoginComplete()`, `getTelegramAppLoginUrl()`. Cookie `webSessionID`, `SameSite=Lax`. |
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| `AdminAuthService` | Admin session. Same signal/method shape plus `getAdminToken()`/`setAdminTokens()`/`clearAdminTokens()` (reserved for when the backend issues admin JWTs) and `devBypassLogin()` (no-ops outside dev mode). Cookie `adminSessionID`, `SameSite=Strict`. |
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| `TelegramSessionApiService` | Thin HTTP client + response normalization. Holds no state, writes no cookies. |
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| `adminAuthGuard` | `CanActivateFn` — allows if the admin session is authenticated, otherwise opens the login dialog. |
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| `adminAuthHeadersInterceptor` | Attaches `AdminWebSessionID` (and `Authorization: Bearer` when a token exists) to admin-gated paths only (`/admin/`, `/backoffice/`, `/builder/`, `/media/`). Never touches customer requests. |
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| `AuthSession`, `WebSessionStart`, `AuthStatus`, `AdminAuthStatus` | Wire/state types. |
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Typical usage:
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```ts
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import { AuthService, AdminAuthService, adminAuthGuard, adminAuthHeadersInterceptor } from '@marketplaces/auth';
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// routes
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{ path: 'backoffice', canActivate: [adminAuthGuard], loadComponent: ... }
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// http
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provideHttpClient(withInterceptors([adminAuthHeadersInterceptor, ...]))
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// component
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private readonly auth = inject(AuthService);
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readonly isLoggedIn = this.auth.isAuthenticated; // signal
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```
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**Security note:** the Telegram session API has no concept of "admin." The frontend cannot distinguish an admin Telegram session from a regular one — it only decides *where to store* the result. Real admin authorization must be enforced server-side on every admin request. See [TRACK-S](backend/TRACK-S-SECURITY-RBAC-CONTRACT.md).
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### `ed25519/` — prepared, backend not shipped
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Challenge/response admin auth: `GET /api/admin/auth/challenge` → sign nonce with a device-local non-extractable Ed25519 key → `POST /api/admin/auth/verify` → JWT pair. Calling these today 404s/connection-errors, which surfaces as the `backend-unavailable` error screen. Nothing is mocked.
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| Export | What it is |
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|---|---|
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| `AuthFacade` | The surface components should use. `isAuthenticated`, `status`, `role`, `loginPhase`, `lastError`; `login(redirectTo?)`, `logout(redirectTo?)`, `restoreSession()`, `can(permission)`. |
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| `Ed25519AuthService` | Low-level flow orchestrator (exported under this name so it doesn't collide with the telegram `AuthService`). |
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| `SessionService` | JWT/refresh pair + derived claims, auto-refresh before expiry. |
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| `Ed25519KeypairService` | WebCrypto Ed25519 keypair in IndexedDB. Private key is non-extractable and never leaves the device. |
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| `PermissionService` | Derives permissions from the JWT `role` claim. UI-only gate. |
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| `JwtService` | Decode only, never verification — the frontend has no trusted key; signature checking is the backend's job on every request. |
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| `Ed25519VerificationService` / `NoopEd25519VerificationService` | Abstract seam + fail-closed default binding. |
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| `AdminRole`, `Permission`, `ROLE_PERMISSIONS`, `AuthChallenge`, `AuthTokenPair`, `JwtClaims`, `AuthError`, `AuthErrorCode`, … | Types and wire contracts. |
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Bind the verification seam in `app.config.ts`:
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```ts
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{ provide: Ed25519VerificationService, useClass: NoopEd25519VerificationService },
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```
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## 4. What deliberately stayed in the app
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`AdminPermissionsService` and `requireAdminPermission` live in `marketplaces` (`src/app/core/admin-auth/`), not in the package. They read this app's mock Users domain to derive a permission set — app-specific, not a portable auth concern. If another project needs permission gating it should use the package's `PermissionService` (JWT-claim-driven) instead.
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## 5. `@marketplaces/payment`
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Published at `0.1.0` but **scaffold only** — no implementation yet, nothing exported, and `marketplaces` does not depend on it. `core/finance` and `core/pricing` still live in the app. Payment business logic is server-side by design (see [Phase 1](backend/PHASE-1-MONEY-FX-PAYMENTS-CONTRACT.md) and [Phase 7](backend/PHASE-7-PAYMENTS-RECONCILIATION-CONTRACT.md)); the eventual package is a thin client for FX/pricing/checkout gateways.
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## 6. Making a change to a package
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1. Clone [vitanovaPackages](https://sources.vitanova.network/sdarbinyan/vitanovaPackages.git).
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2. Edit under `packages/auth/src` (or `packages/payment/src`), export from `index.ts`.
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3. `npx changeset` at the repo root — pick the package and bump type, write one line about the change.
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4. Commit, push, open a PR to `main`. CI builds, tests, and rejects the PR if the changeset is missing.
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5. On merge, CI rebuilds and force-pushes `release/auth` / `release/payment`, and opens a "Version Packages" PR if there are unreleased changesets.
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6. In `marketplaces`, run `npm update @marketplaces/auth`, then the build + test suite before merging.
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Never commit to a `release/*` branch — they are generated and force-pushed. Never edit `node_modules/@marketplaces/*` — overwritten on every install.
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