marketplaces/docs/FORK-HARVEST-TODO.md

Fork Harvest — TODO

Branch: improvements/fork-harvest (from B2B @ 92f1c88) Design: 2026-08-21-fork-harvest-design.md Source analysis: FORK-ANALYSIS-2026-08-21.md

Improvements only. Nothing here regresses our Angular version, test count, or architecture governance.

Effort: S ≤ half a day · M ≤ 2 days · L > 2 days Lane: A frontend · B backend contract · C @marketplaces/auth package · D infra/ops · E process

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Wave 0 — Decide first (blocks Wave 4)

• FH-0.1 — Decide the central identity host · L · Lane C · blocker VK ID and Yandex ID both validate redirect_uri against an exact registered list. We cannot register one per tenant domain, and we cannot let tenants supply their own. Decision needed: single central callback host (e.g. id.<platform-domain>) as the only registered URI, tenant carried inside signed state, 302 back to the tenant domain with a short-lived signed handoff token the tenant API exchanges for a session cookie. Also decide: is one VK account across two of our storefronts one Customer or two? Their platform says two; our Customer.marketplaceId already implies two. Done when: an ADR exists in docs/context/adrs/ and both questions have a recorded answer.

• FH-0.2 — Confirm the server-priced checkout path covers every live flow · S · Lane A · blocks FH-1.3 api.service.ts already has a server-priced checkout session method. Confirm no production flow still depends on createPayment(payload, headers) before deleting the header path. Done when: every caller of the legacy header path is enumerated and has a replacement.

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Wave 1 — Live defects with a security benefit (Lane A, this sprint)

• FH-1.1 — Kill the plaintext third-party geo call · S · Lane A src/app/services/location.service.ts:75 calls http://ip-api.com/json/?fields=… from an HTTPS origin. Browsers block mixed active content, so detectLocation() has been silently taking its error branch in production — region auto-detect is dead, not just insecure. It is also a third-party geo leak on every session. Do: remove the direct call. Resolve region server-side (GET /api/v1/geo/resolve, backend reads the client IP) or drop auto-detect and keep the manual region picker. Done when: zero http:// literals in src/; a unit test asserts detectLocation() issues no cross-origin request to a non-allowlisted host.

• FH-1.2 — Stop blindly trusting the bank redirect URL · M · Lane A src/app/pages/cart/cart.component.ts:485 — bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl(bankUrl) with no validation, rendered into a popup iframe. Most acquirer 3-D Secure pages send X-Frame-Options: DENY, so the popup is blank for those banks. Their spec: card checkout navigates the current tab, no intermediate popup. Do: accept only an https: URL whose origin the backend returned in the payment response (backend allowlist, per their safeHttpsUrl()); navigate the current tab instead of framing. Done when: a non-https or non-allowlisted URL is refused with a visible payment error; a test covers both the accepted and the refused case.

• FH-1.3 — Remove provider credentials from the browser · M · Lane A · depends on FH-0.2 src/app/services/api.service.ts:675 sets authorization-key and userid-value headers client-side. api.service.ts:143 ships a partner ID literal ('web-97ec-9c57-4dde-9037-3a68f7f83750') in the bundle. Their audit's most serious finding, and it is correct. Do: delete both header paths and the literal; the browser gets a checkout URL or a status endpoint, never a credential. Done when: grep -ri "authorization-key\|userid-value" src/ returns nothing; no partner ID literal in dist/; a CI check greps the built bundle for both patterns.

• FH-1.4 — Send Idempotency-Key on payment creation · S · Lane A Zero idempot* anywhere in our codebase. Their API requires the header and rejects a key reused across a different order. Do: generate one key per checkout attempt, stable across retries and across a double-click, sent on payment creation. Done when: the existing checkout-idempotent-click.spec.ts asserts both requests carry the same key.

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Wave 2 — Contract hardening (Lane B, parallel with Wave 1)

Each item is normative text plus an acceptance scenario in docs/backend/BACKEND-HANDOFF.md, so it becomes a delivery gate rather than a wish.

• FH-2.1 — Conditional-UPDATE stock reservation · S · PHASE-6-CART-CHECKOUT-CONTRACT.md UPDATE … SET reserved = reserved + $qty WHERE (onHand - reserved) >= $qty RETURNING id; empty result → 409. Reservation TTL 15 min. Price read only from the server-side snapshot, never from the request. Acceptance: two concurrent purchases of the last unit produce exactly one payable order.

• FH-2.2 — Idempotency as unique constraints · S · PHASE-7-PAYMENTS-RECONCILIATION-CONTRACT.md Payment.idempotencyKey UNIQUE; a key reused against a different order/marketplace → 409. PaymentWebhookEvent @@unique([provider, eventKey]); duplicate insert → {accepted: true, duplicate: true}. eventKey falls back to sha256(rawBody). Signature verified against the raw body. Status poll as a 24-hour reconciliation fallback. Acceptance: a replayed webhook neither completes the order twice nor moves stock twice.

• FH-2.3 — Session and credential model · M · TRACK-S-SECURITY-RBAC-CONTRACT.md Server-stored sessions; random 32 bytes; stored as SHA-256 hash only; HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite; revocable; a distinct cookie per contour (bo_session / manager_session / marketplace_session). Argon2id memoryCost 65536, timeCost 3, parallelism 1. TOTP mandatory, gated by a signed 10-minute setup token. Password change ≥16 chars and revokes every live session in the same transaction. Role weights ORDER_MANAGER 0 < VIEWER 1 < CONTENT_MANAGER 2 < ADMIN 3 < OWNER 4, checked together with marketplace scope. Acceptance: a CONTENT_MANAGER cannot read an unassigned marketplace through a direct API call.

• FH-2.4 — Origin allowlist for admin mutations · S · TRACK-S-SECURITY-RBAC-CONTRACT.md Global hook: any non-GET on an admin/manager path whose Origin is not in the configured allowlist → 403. CORS uses the same allowlist with credentials: true. Acceptance: a cross-origin POST with a valid session cookie is refused.

• FH-2.5 — Tenant by verified Host only · S · PHASE-9-TENANT-REGISTRY-DOMAINS-CONTRACT.md Normalize host (lowercase, strip trailing dot, strip port) → unique hostname row → require verifiedAt and ACTIVE. Short cache with explicit invalidation. Unknown host → 404, never a fallback tenant. The public API never accepts a marketplaceId from the browser. Acceptance: an unknown Host returns 404 and leaks no other tenant's data.

• FH-2.6 — Signed preview token, read-only preview · S · PHASE-9-… HMAC-signed token carrying {marketplaceId, expiresAt, nonce}, 15-minute TTL, storefront_preview cookie. Global hook returns 404 Preview mode is read-only for any non-GET while that cookie is present. Preview is not indexable. Acceptance: a mutation attempted in preview mode is refused.

• FH-2.7 — Immutable revisions, rollback, clone · M · new section, PHASE-9-… version = max(version) + 1, immutable snapshot row, publishedRevision pointer flipped in the same transaction. Rollback creates a new revision; history is never rewritten. Clone copies design + catalog assignments, forces inventory to 0, never copies domains/customers/orders/secrets, and walks the category tree topologically with explicit cycle detection. Acceptance: rollback restores the chosen revision and leaves live inventory untouched.

• FH-2.8 — Append-only inventory journal · S · PHASE-3-CATALOG-OFFER-FULFILLMENT-CONTRACT.md Every stock change writes reason, referenceType, referenceId, actorId, resulting balance. Direct answer to the v3.1 "we cannot explain your numbers" complaint. Acceptance: any current quantity is reconstructible from the journal alone.

• FH-2.9 — Per-tenant encrypted credentials · S · PHASE-1 / PHASE-7 AES-256-GCM, versioned envelope v1.iv.tag.ciphertext (base64url), 32-byte key from the environment. Decrypted only inside the service; never serialized into any response. Redirect/callback URLs built backend-side and allowlisted. Acceptance: no credential appears in any API response, JS bundle, or browser storage.

• FH-2.10 — Server-side storefront config validation · M · PHASE-10-CONTENT-MODULES-CONTRACT.md The server re-runs our editor's validation. Clamp-and-fallback ergonomics: clamp out-of-range numbers rather than rejecting; blank a URL that is not local /path or https:// rather than erroring; fall back an invalid colour. Cap sections per page and IDs per list. Acceptance: a hand-crafted API call cannot store a config the editor would have refused.

• FH-2.11 — Digital goods · M · PHASE-3-… FulfillmentMode: MANUAL | CODE_POOL. DigitalCode pool with AVAILABLE/RESERVED/ASSIGNED/REVOKED, encrypted value, valueHash unique per (marketplace, variant). Codes revealed only when the order is PAID/PROCESSING/FULFILLED. Acceptance: an unpaid order never returns a code.

• FH-2.12 — Marketplace status machine · S · PHASE-9-… DRAFT → DOMAIN_PENDING → READY → ACTIVE → SUSPENDED, with DOMAIN_PENDING as a real state rather than an error condition.

• FH-2.13 — Order public token, not sequential IDs · S · PHASE-2-ORDERS-NOTIFICATIONS-CONTRACT.md Orders are addressed publicly by a random base64url token. Order line items carry an immutable snapshot of name, SKU, price, currency, delivery, and contact data at purchase time.

• FH-2.14 — Order-manager as a separate contour · M · TRACK-S-… Separate URL, shell, cookie, and login; scoped to assigned marketplaces via membership rows, not an environment variable (their env-pinned slug is the one part not to copy). No visibility into catalog, design, domains, payment settings, or platform users. PII masked in lists, revealed in detail only with permission, and both export and reveal are logged.

• FH-2.15 — CSV marketplace import with dryRun default true · S · PARTNER-PROVISIONING-API-CONTRACT.md Bulk tenant creation as a first-class operation: validate fully without writing, report create/update/skip/error per row, then confirm.

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Wave 3 — Proof (Lane A)

• FH-3.1 — E2E: concurrent purchase of the last unit · M · e2e/ Their §22 scenario 3. Two sessions race for the final unit; exactly one payable order results, the other gets a clean out-of-stock state.

• FH-3.2 — E2E: replayed webhook · M · e2e/ Their §22 scenario 10. The same provider event delivered twice does not complete the order twice or move stock twice.

• FH-3.3 — Bundle budget as a blocking CI check · S · angular.json, .github/workflows/ Currently 1.15 MB against a 700 kB budget — 452 kB over, and the only performance criticism of us that is objectively measured. Make the budget fail the build.

• FH-3.4 — Split storefront / editor / backoffice deployables · L · angular.json, routes The single deployable bundle is both the bundle-size cause and a real separation-of-concerns problem: shipping editor and admin code to every anonymous storefront visitor. Separate bundles, separate budgets, separate CSP. Done when: the storefront entry point is under budget and contains no admin or editor code.

• FH-3.5 — Bundle secret scan in CI · S · .github/workflows/ Grep the built output for credential patterns (authorization-key, userid-value, partner ID shapes, any client_secret). Fails the build on a hit. Cheap insurance against FH-1.3 regressing.

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Wave 4 — Identity: VK ID + Yandex ID (Lane C, @marketplaces/auth)

Blocked on FH-0.1. Nothing to copy from the archive — it has zero VK/Yandex/OAuth code. We take the session-issuing shape of their Telegram flow and terminate both providers into it.

• FH-4.1 — Provider-agnostic social identity surface · M Collapse VkIdGateway into SocialIdentityGateway:

  export type SocialProvider = 'vk' | 'yandex';
  export interface SocialIdentityGateway {
    getAuthorizeUrl(provider: SocialProvider, returnTo?: string): Observable<string>;
    listIdentities(): Observable<ExternalIdentity[]>;
    unlink(provider: SocialProvider): Observable<void>;
  }
  

  Touches: src/app/core/identity/services/vk-id-gateway.interface.ts, vk-id-api.gateway.ts, vk-id-local.gateway.ts, vk-id-gateway.token.ts, src/app/components/vk-id-login/ → social-login-button. Add 'yandex_id' to ExternalIdentityProvider in core/identity/models/customer-identity.model.ts.

• FH-4.2 — Move PKCE ownership to the backend · S · Lane B + C Today completeCallback(code, codeVerifier) forces the browser to generate and hold the verifier. We are a confidential client. Backend generates state + code_verifier, stores them single-use for 10 minutes, handles the callback, and redirects. completeCallback() leaves the frontend entirely. Contract endpoints: GET /api/identity/v1/{provider}/authorize, GET /api/identity/v1/{provider}/callback, POST /{provider}/unlink, GET /me/identities. Update PHASE-8-IDENTITY-MESSAGING-CONTRACT.md §2.

• FH-4.3 — ExternalIdentity model · S · Lane B

  @@unique([provider, providerUserId])   // one provider account -> one customer
  

  Conflict is not an upsert: a providerUserId already bound to a different Customer routes to controlled resolution. The unique index makes the database refuse a silent rebind. Per-tenant OAuth app config stored encrypted (same envelope as FH-2.9): { clientId, clientSecret, scopes[], redirectUri }.

• FH-4.4 — VK ID · M OAuth 2.1, PKCE mandatory (S256). Authorize https://id.vk.com/authorize; token POST https://id.vk.com/oauth2/auth; profile POST https://id.vk.com/oauth2/user_info; logout https://id.vk.com/oauth2/logout on unlink. Trap to write into the contract: the callback returns device_id alongside code, and the token exchange fails without it. This is the most common VK ID integration bug. VK often does not return an email — email must stay optional on Customer.

• FH-4.5 — Yandex ID · S · after FH-4.4 OAuth 2.0 with PKCE. Authorize https://oauth.yandex.ru/authorize; token POST https://oauth.yandex.ru/token with HTTP Basic client_id:client_secret; profile GET https://login.yandex.ru/info?format=json with header Authorization: OAuth <token> → id, login, default_email, default_phone, psuid. A second strategy object against the same surface — roughly a day once VK works. Confirm exact parameter and scope names against live provider docs; both providers revised their flows recently.

• FH-4.6 — Migrate Telegram onto ExternalIdentity · M · Lane B + C Telegram becomes one provider among several rather than the schema's only key. Ends the shared customer/admin Telegram session their audit flagged.

• FH-4.7 — Account linking UI · M /me/identities — show linked providers, link, unlink, and surface the conflict-resolution path from FH-4.3.

• FH-4.8 — Email/phone OTP repositioned as recovery · S · Lane E Our approved email/phone login spec stays valid but drops below VK ID and becomes the fallback when a messenger channel is unavailable, per v3.1 §14.

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Continuous — Ops (Lane D)

• FH-D.1 — Proven restore drill · M We have deploy automation and no proven restore. Add a restore-check script and schedule it. Their restore-check.sh + WAL archiving (wal_level=replica, archive_mode=on, archive_timeout=300) is the model. Done when: a restore into a clean environment has been executed and its result recorded.

• FH-D.2 — Database unreachable from the internet, structurally · S · Lane B/D Data network internal: true; API bound to loopback only; no-new-privileges on every service. Makes it a property of the topology rather than a firewall promise.

• FH-D.3 — Host hardening we lack · M fail2ban jail, sshd hardening drop-in, sysctl hardening, scoped sudoers per deploy role. Add to scripts/deploy/server-setup.sh. Keep ours where ours is better: add-domain.sh already pre-checks the DNS A record and runs nginx -t before and after; server-setup.sh already configures ufw. Do not copy their hardcoded server IP.

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Continuous — Process (Lane E)

• FH-E.1 — Adopt the nine invariants as a signed acceptance gate · S From their handoff §7: tenant by Host not by a browser-supplied ID; order price computed backend; stock and reservation atomic; payment webhook idempotent; credentials never leave the backend; published revision immutable; design rollback does not roll back live inventory; no user reads an unassigned marketplace through UI or API; every admin mutation leaves an audit trail. Put them at the head of docs/backend/BACKEND-HANDOFF.md as gates, not aspirations.

• FH-E.2 — PR policy · S One functional area per PR. Mandatory: purpose, screenshots, API changes, migrations, test evidence, security impact, rollback plan. Never change payment/inventory/order state machines inside a redesign PR.

• FH-E.3 — Release discipline · S "A local build or the existence of a UI does not mean production readiness." Every release records version, migrations, healthcheck, smoke result, dependency audit, and a rollback path.

• FH-E.4 — ADR for the harvest · S Record the decision: adopt these improvements, reject their architecture, keep our frontend and governance. Include the §9 rejection list so it does not get relitigated.

• FH-E.5 — Reduce localStorage to cache, never truth · M · Lane A 19 files touch localStorage, mostly admin facades and project-editor-draft-storage.service.ts. Their disqualifying objection is not "you use localStorage" — it is "localStorage is your source of truth." Do: keep local drafts as an offline convenience with an explicit "unsaved local draft" indicator and server-wins reconciliation; never let a local value be the published state. Done when: no admin or editor write path can publish without a server round-trip.

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Scoreboard

Wave	Items	Lane	Blocked by
0 — Decide	2	C, A	—
1 — Live defects	4	A	FH-0.2 (one item)
2 — Contracts	15	B	—
3 — Proof	5	A	—
4 — Identity	8	C	FH-0.1
Ops	3	D	—
Process	5	E	—
Total	42

Start here: FH-0.1 (escalate today, it is a one-way door), then FH-1.1 and FH-1.4 — both are small, both are live defects, and both close findings their audit will otherwise keep raising.